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ABSTRACT 
 
The present paper analyzes the valuation effects of geographical diversification by examining 
mergers and acquisitions involving acquirers from 12 developed European countries and U.S. 
target firms over the period 1999-2007. Our findings suggest that acquisitions of overvalued 
U.S. targets do not cause, on average, any significant change in the excess values of 
European acquirers. However, after controlling for the undervaluation of the targets, we find 
that acquiring a fairly valued or undervalued company has no statistically significant 
influence at 10% level, but it is value enhancing at 12% significance level. Besides 
undervaluation of the target firm, other factors that influence the change in excess value of 
the acquirer are the cultural difference between the merging firms’ countries (negative 
impact) and the strength of the bidder’s currency (positive impact). Furthermore, it was 
found that target firm shareholders experience significant wealth gains of over 25% from the 
announcement date up until delisting 
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PURPOSE The aim of this study is to determine to what extent cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions in related industries initiated by European 
companies on U.S. targets are value-enhancing. Further, the study is 
intended to measure the excess wealth gained by foreign target 
shareholders from announcement up until delisting.  
Prior research in the field of corporate international diversification has 
mainly been targeted on US acquirers. This study provides further 
evidence from developed European firms. 
 
METHODOLOGY This paper employs the same valuation methodology as Bodnar, Tang 
and Weintrop(2003) in order to determine excess value measures for 
the acquirers and foreign target companies. In addition, distribution 
analysis and regression analysis are used to observe how the excess 
value of acquirers varies with different variables. 
 
EMPIRICAL 
FOUNDATION 
Reuters database contains information on mergers and acquisitions. 
Datastream and Reuters databases are used to collect accounting data 
and share prices for the analyzed companies. 
 
COCLUSIONS Our results show that, on average, U.S. target firms are overvalued, 
less profitable, less financially levered and make fewer investments 
compared to European firms that have not yet diversified in the U.S. 
However, the target firm shareholders experience an increase in their 
wealth of over 25% from the announcement date to delisting. 
Overall, European bidders do not create or destroy value by adding an 
overvalued company relative to the year before the acquisition, but 
adding an overvalued company destroys the possible value created as 
an effect of the synergies resulting from the merger. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a background for international mergers and acquisitions; presents and 
motivates the choice of research topic and gives delimitation of the thesis purpose. The 
chapter ends with a description of the audience and a thesis outline. 
 
1.1. Background 
On May 7th 1998, Chrysler announced a $37 bn. merger with Daimler-Benz. The stock swap 
deal was the largest transatlantic transaction at the time and was considered a “marriage 
made in heaven” of two equal companies that would change the face of the industry. 
Chrysler was the 3rd largest US car maker and the most profitable in the mid 1990’s. Chrysler 
management forecasted the need of large amounts of cash to keep the products up to date and 
to expand to new and emerging markets in order to secure its position as one of the most 
important automaker company in the rapidly changing industry. The long term strategy was a 
merger that would help the company to reach this goal. 
Daimler-Benz was a premium engineering automaker with strong brands that tried to find 
ways of improving efficiency and the economies of scale a merger offered seemed appealing. 
The merger appeared promising combining the German engineering and the American 
marketing expertise into a new company, the 5th largest automaker in the world. The benefits 
stated at the time are among the most cited benefits of mergers: growth possibilities, 
increased market opportunities, increased purchasing power, synergies coming from shared 
distribution logistics, sharing know-how. The premiere global automotive company was 
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supposed to be of great strength, with combined presence around the world and limited 
product-overlap (Daimler-Benz focusing on premium segment and Chrysler on medium and 
economic segments). Centralized purchasing, distribution and administrative structure, 
shared R&D and the possibility of exchanging components would have brought about annual 
savings of $3 bn. in 3 years. Exploiting all these benefits and the new market opportunities 
would, in the end, have lead to increased shareholder value. 
However, the market capitalization of the combined company, which was immediately after 
the merger around $100 bn. dropped in just 3 years to $44 bn., a value lower than the value 
of Daimler alone before merger.  The synergies failed to appear; the distribution systems 
remained separated due to brand bias, Mercedes distributors refusing to include the less fancy 
Chrysler. The cultural differences had a strong impact, leading to discontent between 
employees and small scandals. Chrysler Group began to lose money. By last quarter of 2000 
Daimler-Chrysler registered its first quarterly loss of about $269 mil. as a result of $1.4 bn. 
loss registered by Chrysler. The situation has not changed much with time. In 2006 Chrysler 
registered a $1.5 bn. loss and it was finally sold in 2007 to a private equity firm for 7.4 bn. 
This is just one example of many failures in the merger activity. A merger that was very 
promising proved to be value destroying in the end. Shareholders of both companies saw 
their stake in Daimler-Chrysler shrink in value. One would think that managers had learned 
their lesson from value destroying mergers in the past. But have they?   
1.2. Problem Discussion 
It is well known that failures and mistakes are a taboo topic for practitioners and that few 
lessons were learnt by managers from past value destroying mergers and acquisitions. To 
shed further light on this important aspect of today’s corporate activity, the current paper 
aims to reveal whether and to what extent corporate international diversification through 
mergers and acquisitions creates value for the acquiring and target firm’s shareholders. 
The poor reputation of mergers and acquisitions has its heredity in a number of spectacular 
failures in the 1990’s, as well as in research papers that show value destruction for acquiring 
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shareholders in up to 80% of deals (see, for example, Datta & Puia, 1995; Christophe, 1997 
and Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002). On the other hand, another group of scholars reached 
different conclusions, providing empirical evidence that, in fact, cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions create value for both acquirer and target firm’s shareholders (Errunza and 
Senbert, 1981; Errunza and Senbert, 1984; Markides and Ittner, 1994, and Bodnar, Tang and 
Weintrop, 2003).  
In addition to this “good news” provided by researchers, reasons why companies choose to 
engage in international merging activities include one or more of the following factors: 
improved operating margin through reduction of operating costs, diversification of product 
and service offerings in order to stay competitive, larger market share, reduction of financial 
risk, increased plant capacity, utilization of operational expertise and research and 
development. Additionally, a large number of mergers in the mid-1990’s occurred as a 
response to the integration of global markets or due to deregulation, changes in technology and 
industry consolidation. Receptivity of both the equity and debt markets to large strategic 
transactions is another incentive for companies engaging in mergers and acquisitions, and so 
is the pressure to increase shareholder value.  
Some argue that management aggrandizement is also a reason why companies continue to pursue 
mergers and studies proved that hubris-based M&A-s are usually the ones that are found to be 
value-destroying, as opposed to synergy-oriented M&A-s (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2002). 
In spite of the vast amount of research in the field of corporate value creation through 
mergers and acquisitions, there are few, if any papers that focus on developed European 
companies acquiring targets from countries outside the European Union. This thesis analyzes 
a sample of mergers and acquisitions initiated by companies from 12 Western European 
countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) having as targets US firms.   
In the last two decades, mergers and acquisitions have become a truly global phenomenon 
and Europe begun experiencing a rapid growth in merger activity. European developed 
countries are chosen as acquirers as we expect them to have more harmonized legislation as a 
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result of European Union steps towards a more integrated market and therefore to offer 
representative results. 
We focus on US targets as US is one of the major market that European companies invest in.  
Table 1.1:  Number of M&A initiated by European countries with non-European targets between 1999 -
2007 
Country Number of M&A 1999- 2007
United States 3135
Australia 301
Canada 291
Brazil 212
Russian Federation 174
South Africa 163
India 148
Argentina 146
Turkey 131
Mexico 118
China 116
Japan 95
Chile 80
Singapore 78
Hong Kong 71
Indonesia 36
Thailand 34
Egypt 33
New Zealand 32
Israel 31  
Data source: Reuters Database 
Table 1.1 presents the number of acquisitions by country made by Western European 
companies in other markets than Europe during 1999 – 2007.  57.8% of this kind of 
transactions had US targets suggesting extensive US-EU economic relations.  
1.3. Purpose  
The aim of this study is to determine to what extent cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 
related industries initiated by European companies with US targets are value-enhancing. We 
intend to establish how the correct valuation of the target influences the results and to what 
degree such a correct valuation leads to value creation for the shareholders of the acquiring 
firm. Further, it is determined how the cultural difference between the countries and the 
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strength of the acquirer currency influence the results alongside with corporate variables. The 
study will also determine the short term announcement effect on foreign target shareholder 
wealth (the return for target shareholders from announcement date to delisting).   
1.4. Delimitations 
Our study does not investigate the effects of industrial diversification as it is largely accepted 
that it is value destroying (Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008; Denis, Denis and Yost, 
2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).  
We will only be looking at the effects on shareholder value following mergers and 
acquisitions where both acquirer and target are publicly traded firms. 
Due to lack of data, we will not take into consideration whether the company establishes 
operations abroad for the first time or not. We argue this will not impact our results as there 
is week evidence that premiere cross-border acquisitions add or destroy value, but rather the 
foreign targets are not fairly valued (Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008). 
We also disregard companies in the financial, real estate and investment sectors, since they 
have certain particularities in terms of balance sheet structure and financing procedures.  
1.5. Audience 
Our study will be of interest to students at Master in Finance, participants to Master Seminar 
of School of Economics and Management of Lund University and academics in the field of 
corporate finance.  
Another category of audience is represented by investors and managers, which have a market 
perspective on the subject rather than an academic one.  
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1.6. Thesis Outline 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into five chapters: 
Chapter 2: The purpose of this chapter is to review the mergers and acquisitions activity 
over time and to present the characteristics of each period, determinants of 
merger waves and new trends. 
Chapter 3:  Chapter three gives an overview of the theoretical framework related to 
international diversification. We also consider the methodologies used over the 
past three decades to value multinational companies.  
Chapter 4: This chapter presents data collection and methodology used in the empirical 
study. 
Chapter 5: The chapter shows the empirical findings following from the methodology 
presented previously and the results from the analysis performed. 
Chapter 6:  The last chapter consists of conclusions, reflections on the study, and 
comparison with previous studies. 
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2. HISTORY OF MERGERS 
 
This chapter presents the merger activity over time, discusses the determinants, the impact of 
merger waves, the characteristics of each period and new trends. 
 
2.1. General Considerations 
It is considered that there are six waves in the merger activity (1893 to 1904, 1919 to 1929, 
1955 to 1969, 1974-80 to 1989, 1993 to 2000 (Gaughan, 2007) and 2003 to present), each 
with its own unique structure of deals and characteristics. Each of them impacted industries 
changing their structure from a set of small size firms to the current state that includes 
powerful multinational companies, legal framework leading to the development of antitrust 
laws and fair practices, and the economic environment in general.  
Mergers and acquisitions are a cyclic phenomenon, periods of high merger activity being 
followed by a relatively small number of acquisitions.  
Figure 2.1: Value of M&A in US and Europe 1990 – 2007 
Value of M&A in US and Europe 1990 - 2007
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Data source: Thomson Financial, 2008 
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US are the stage where merger and acquisitions started and flourished and then spread to 
other markets. It is not until the fifth wave, that Europe can be considered as a major actor in 
merger activity (Gaughan, 2007). Acquisitions proved to be a global phenomenon and their 
changes in volume in Europe are similar with US (see Figure 2.1). 
Merger activity is correlated with the economic activity, and the optimism of investors, 
following the trends of capital markets (see Figure 2.2). Most of the merger waves ended 
with the appearance of a recession or start of a war: the fifth wave in Europe ended with the 
burst of the Internet Bubble and the slump of capital market indexes; the latest merger wave 
is probably brought to an end by the current financial crisis.  
Figure 2.2: Evolution of S&P Europe 350 and European M&A 1990 - 2007 
Evolution of S&P Europe 350 and European M&A 1990 - 2007
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Data source:  
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_euro350/2,3,2,5,0,0,0,0,0,5,1,0,0,0,0,
0.html, Thomson Financial, 2008  
In general all the merger waves tend to be caused by a combination of economic, regulatory 
and technological shocks. The economic shocks come in the form of economic expansion – 
firms merge to meet rapidly growing demand, regulatory shocks refer to deregulation in 
certain industries, and technological shocks come in the form of technological changes that 
can dramatically alter an industry or create new ones. However, the appearance of such 
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shocks does not assure the start of a new wave. It has to be correlated with market 
misevaluations (Gaughan, 2007). 
Martin Lipton in his Davies Lecture at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University on 
September 14, 2006 separates between exogenous factors affecting mergers and autogenous 
factors. The Exogenous factors consist of: accounting treatment (pooling vs. purchasing 
methods), existence of activist hedge funds, arbitrageurs, different currencies, LBO funds, 
movement towards market capitalism and privatization of state owned companies, 
deregulation of specific industries. The exogenous factors rather determine whether a merger 
is possible or not at a certain moment. The autogenous factors, on the other side, are reasons 
for engaging in merger activities: obtaining market power, improving operating margin, 
integrating back to the source of raw material or forward to control the means of distribution, 
having a more complete product line in order to be competitive, spreading the financial risk, 
spreading the huge cost of developing new technology. 
We are further going to present the characteristics of each period as they are all important to 
the current state. 
2.2. The First Wave (1893 to 1904), (Gaughan, 2007) 
The first wave begun after the depression of 1893 and was dominated by horizontal mergers 
that led to the consolidation of eight  major industries: primary metals, food products, 
petroleum products, chemicals, transportation equipment, fabricated metal products, 
machinery and bituminous coal.  
Most of the industries at that time comprised of small and inefficient firms, or of companies 
competing on prices, trying to drive each other out. There was the need of reorganization of 
the industries which was done by holding company trusts. The merger activity was driven by 
the development of transportation system. Now firms could serve national markets and 
competition from distant rivals pressured mergers with local companies. Companies also 
considered the economies of scale a merger could offer in order to improve efficiency. 
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There was little and ineffective legislation regulating takeovers which led to appearance of 
takeover wars and voluntary ethical code – enforced by unwritten agreement between 
investment bankers. The giant companies that appeared during that period, some of which are 
still present DuPont Inc., Standard Oil, General electric, Eastman Kodak, American Tobacco, 
threatened to become, and some even became monopolies. The top 100 industrial 
corporations owned 18 % of the assets of all industrial corporations. New antitrust legislation 
in order to avoid the excessive dilution of competition and unethical behaviour was adopted. 
The new companies were in need of new managerial skills in order to be effectively 
managed. Most of these mergers failed to achieve improved efficiency. The weak banking 
system and the stock market crash from 1904 brought this wave to an end. 
2.3. The Second Wave (1919 to 1929), (Gaughan, 2007) 
Compared with the first wave that resulted in monopolistic structures, the second one 
produced oligopolies. This period characterized by vertical integration was stimulated by the 
post World War I boom.  
Even though the antitrust law was stricter, the government concentrated on amending unfair 
business practice rather than anticompetitive mergers. The limited enforcement of antitrust 
laws and the persistence of business cooperatives organized during the war contributed to the 
further consolidation of the industries. There were five industries that experienced excessive 
merger activity during the second merger wave: primary metals, petroleum products, food 
products, chemicals, transportation equipment. At the same time competition was enhanced 
by the large scale spread of radio.  
We also assist to the first large scale development of conglomerates and significant use of 
debt which led to increased financial risk. In these conditions investment bankers had a very 
big influence as the banking industry was very concentrated and bankers did not compete 
with each other, founding their business on long term relationships with the clients.  
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The second wave ended in 1929 with the stock crash from October 29. This collapse led to a 
drop in business and investment confidence and the recession that followed brought a fall in 
consumer spending that forced the companies to avoid any additional risk. 
2.4. The Third Wave (1955 to 1969) 
The booming economy in that period eased the appearance of a new merger wave. Due to 
tougher antitrust legislation, mergers that significantly reduced the competition were illegal 
so companies in search of growth opportunities followed a diversification strategy. 80% of 
the mergers in that period were conglomerate mergers. As an effect this development did not 
lead to increased industrial concentration. The expansion in management science also 
accelerated the conglomerate movement as many managers started to believe they could 
manage a more complex corporate structure. (Gaughan, 2007) 
Another characteristic of this period is that smaller firms acquired larger targets in contrast 
with earlier periods when the target was significantly smaller than the acquirer. (Gaughan, 
2007) 
 Because the interest rate for credit financing was high and at the same time equity markets 
were facing a boom, most of the mergers were equity financed. Financing with stocks could 
result in a raise in earnings per share without incurring tax liabilities. Acquisitions were also 
fuelled by the possibility of accounting manipulations that would temporary support the stock 
value and by the use of convertible debentures rather than stock financing. These allowed for 
the earnings of the target company and the acquirer to be added together. The total amount of 
equity of the combined firms would be equal to the equity of the acquirer, thus leading to an 
increase in earnings per share. (Gaughan, 2007) 
The conglomerate trend ended with the first fail of one of these complex companies. The 
merger wave was soon over, following the Tax Reform that ended accounting manipulating 
abuses, limited the valuation of undervalued assets in an acquisition and established that low 
rate convertible debt would be treated as stock. (Gaughan, 2007) 
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Conglomerate stock crashed when stock market fell in 1969. The companies didn’t achieve 
the benefits they thought they would have from diversification. The third wave was an 
opposite movement from specialization, the latter being considered productivity enhancing. 
Most of the mergers failed and non-core activities were divested during the next years. The 
impact of these deals on shareholder value is negative as research has shown. However, the 
diversification discount declines over time. (Servaes, 1996) 
2.5. The Fourth Wave (1974-80 to 1989)  
The fourth merger period is generally referred to as the wave of the mega-mergers or the 
hostile takeover wave of the 1980s, even though it has its genesis in the 1974 first hostile 
takeover bid of Inco seeking to acquire ESB. The success of this transaction gave the green 
light for major investment banks to make hostile takeover bids on behalf of corporate raiders. 
Raiders look for companies with undervalued assets and attempt hostile takeovers by 
purchasing enough shares to gain a controlling interest, or, in most cases, make big profits by 
selling the target shares afterwards to the highest bidder. Arbitragers, such as Ivan Boesky, 
completely changed the strategy of takeovers, as they bought the stock of a target in 
anticipation of a takeover bid being made for it. (Gaughan, 2007) 
In addition to hostile bids, the fourth wave was unique through the use of junk bond 
financing, the increasing volume and size of Leveraged Buyouts, as well as the aggressive 
role of investment bankers. Also, during this period, besieged companies made use of legal 
and political protection strategies against unwanted acquisition offers, some of which were 
considered infringement of interstate commerce by international regulators. Other 
particularities of the fourth merger wave include the role of deregulation, which in Europe 
gave way to many cross-border horizontal mergers, and the large number of international 
mega-mergers, as opposed to the acquisition of small and medium-sized businesses that 
predominated in the third wave. It is during the fourth wave that mergers in the billion-dollar 
range became common. (Gaughan, 2007) 
Table 2.1 shows a list of the leading mega-mergers of the fourth wave. 
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Table 2.1. Ten Largest Acquisitions, 1981-89 
Year Buyer Target Price ($Billions) 
1988 Kohlberg Kravis RJR Nabisco 25.1
1984 Chevron Gulf Oil 13.3
1988 Philip Morris Kraft 13.1
1989 Bristol Myers Squibb 12.5
1984 Texaco Getty Oil 10.1
1981 DuPont Conoco 8.0
1987 British Petroleum Standard Oil of Ohio 7.8
1981 U.S. Steel Marathon Oil 6.6
1988 Campeau Federated Stores 6.5
1986 Kohlberg Kravis Beatrice 6.2
Source: Wall Street Journal, November 1988 
The end of the fourth merger wave was, surprisingly, neither determined by the introduction 
of the poison pill in the mid-1980s nor by the stock market crash in October 1987, but was 
due to the collapse of the junk bond market together with the relatively mild recession in 1989-
1990. 
2.6. The Fifth Wave (1993 to 2000) 
While the first four waves can fairly be called American, the fifth one is considered by 
researchers the first truly international takeover wave (Black, 2000). By 1999, the value of 
transactions in Europe was almost as large as the one in the United States.  The fifth merger 
wave started in the context of the 1990s U.S. economy expansion and continued as a reaction 
to the increasing aggregate demand, the global view on competition and the relatively 
restrained antitrust environment (Gaughan, 2007). 
Large mergers occurred at about the same level as they had during the fourth merger wave, 
but hostile takeover activity diminished. Instead, the opening words for a merger discussion 
were “would you be interested in discussing a merger of equals?”. This led to some of the 
largest deals in history, such as the mergers of Citibank and Travelers, Chrysler and Daimler 
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Benz, Exxon and Mobil, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, AOL and Time Warner, and 
Vodafone and Mannesmann. (Lipton, 2006). 
Whereas many of the mergers of the fourth wave were executed for short-run financial gains, 
mergers of this period emphasized longer term business strategies. There is empirical 
evidence that transactions made at the beginning of the fifth wave had positive effects on 
shareholder value (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005) However, between 1998 and 
2001 striking losses occurred, partially due to hubris-filled managers who believed they were 
responsible for the high share prices, instead of the stock market bubble. Figure 2.3 displays 
the performance of fifth merger wave acquirers. 
Figure 2.3: Yearly Aggregate Dollar Return of Acquiring-Firm Shareholders, 1990-2001 
 Yearly aggregate dollar return of acquiring-firm 
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Source: Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz. "Wealth  destruction on a massive scale? A study of acquiring-firm 
returns in the recent merger wave." Journal of Finance, vol. 60, no. 2 (April 2005). 
Debt-financed mergers were less common than they were during the fourth wave, being 
replaced by an increased use of equity. As another particularity of the fifth wave, certain 
industries such as banking and finance or telecommunications, media and technology (TMT) 
accounted for a disproportionate share of the total dollar volume of M&A in the United States, 
inflating the impact of these sectors. An additional factor that contributed to the large number of 
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bidders and targets during this period was the privatization of state-owned enterprises in less-
developed countries, especially Eastern Europe. (Gaughan, 2007) 
The fifth merger wave ended with the bursting of the Millennium Bubble, large M&A failures, 
like AOL/Time Warner and great scandals, like Enron, which led to an almost nonexistent junk 
bond market, tightened lending standards and not well received merger announcements. (Lipton, 
2006). 
2.7. The Sixth Wave (2003 to present) 
The sixth merger wave began in 2003, less than three years following the end of the previous 
cycle. It was determined by factors such as globalization, government encouragement to 
create strong national or global champions (for example, France and Italy), commodity prices 
increase, the availability of low-interest financing, hedge funds and other shareholder 
activism and the remarkable growth of private equity funds purchasing large stakes in target 
companies (Lipton, 2006). 
This sixth merger wave has been truly global, but perhaps most striking in Europe, and has so 
far seen more focus on strategic fit and paid attention to post-merger integration issues. As 
opposed to during fifth wave, managers are less rewarded nowadays with share options, 
having reduced their temptation to pursue deals that deliver a short-term pay-off at the cost of 
long-term value creation. Additionally, a bigger proportion of deals are being paid for in 
cash, a currency which executives tend to manage more prudently than shares. Finally, 
European reforms have opened the door to a genuine single market, forcing companies to 
focus on building a stronger pan-European competitive position (The Economist, September 
1st 2005). 
On the other hand, the sixth merger wave witnessed the rise in activity of financial buyers 
(hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds) who do not have strategic 
interests as their primary objective, but instead have the ability of pushing up prices for a 
company looking for a strategic merger. This can easily lead to paying excessive prices for 
reputation-enhancing acquisition, which is a slippery slope towards the mistakes made during 
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the previous merger wave. Then again, financial buyers can also have a beneficial influence, 
as they can sharpen up business performance through buying and fixing companies that few 
want and by providing liquidity to the market. (Moeller and Brady, 2007) 
In 2005 Jeffrey Rosen of Lazard investment bank saw great potential for value-creating deals 
within the European Union, as fragmented national economies were merging into a single 
market. But big obstacles needed to be overcome, as some politicians hang on to the idea of 
“national champions” and create obstacles to cross-border mergers and acquisitions. A good 
example is the French government announcing its intention to come up with a list of strategic 
industries that will be protected from foreign takeover, right after the spread of a rumor that 
Danone, a food company that owns much-loved French brands, might be taken over by 
America's PepsiCo. (The Economist, September 1st 2005) 
Up to 2007 more companies have been successful with their acquisitions rather than 
unsuccessful, although it was not clear whether this trend would continue or things will be 
similar to previous merger waves. The volume of worldwide mergers and acquisitions fell by 
30% in 2008 compared with 2007, ending five consecutive years of M&A growth, according 
to Thomson Reuters. But the decline in announced deals would have been even larger 
without the government bailouts of financial institutions, which represented a significant 
share of M&A activity. The number of withdrawn M&A transactions reached an all-time 
record in 2008, including the $46.8 billion leveraged buyout of BCE, Canada's largest 
telecom group, which would have been the largest LBO ever if it had been completed. 
Microsoft's $41.9 billion bid to acquire Yahoo was another major announced deal that was 
withdrawn last year. While mergers and acquisitions in the United States declined by 37.2% 
in volume from 2007, the total M&A activity in the Asia-Pacific region fell by a relatively 
small 8.7%, sustained by deals in China and Southeast Asia (Gordon Platt, Global Finance, 
February 2009) 
These days, abrupt stock price falls determine the negotiations between vendors and buyers 
to proceed under different terms. The current stock prices do not necessarily reflect the 
companies’ real value but rather soak up the pessimistic views of investors. In this case, the 
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real prices lag probably between current low prices and the exaggerated expectations of 
target shareholders1. 
Will the deals from the sixth merger wave remain in history as value creating or value 
destroying? In this paper we intend to shed further light on whether or not the beginning of 
the twenty-first century merger wave brought value-enhancing deals for acquirers from 
developed European countries engaged in transatlantic M&A-s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 http://www.wall-street.ro/articol/English-Version/63216/The-line-where-M-A-activity-intersects-stock-
market.html 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This third chapter presents the theoretical context of value creation through mergers and 
acquisitions, which is threefold. Firstly, a chronological review of earlier studies is 
presented, in accordance with whether or not evidence of value creation or value destruction 
was found. Secondly, earlier research was examined in line with the theoretical perspective it 
refers to. The chapter will be concluded with an answer to the question “to what extent do 
cross-border mergers and acquisition create more value for shareholders than domestic 
deals?” based on the previous mentioned literature. 
 
3.1. Have Cross-Border M&As Created Value over the Years? 
Although earlier empirical studies suggest positive returns for both shareholders of acquirer 
firm and target firm engaged in international diversification through M&A-s, recent evidence 
is mixed.  
The theoretical basis of the first category of studies advocate for the capacity of firms to 
exploit market imperfections to their own benefit when entering a foreign market (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Wilson, 1980).  
Cross-border M&A-s provide operational benefits and risk diversification and, as a result, 
create value for both acquirer and target-firm shareholders (Kang, 1993; Markides and Ittner, 
1994). Strategic benefits are also a ground for M&A-s, as Caves, 1990, argues. Cross-border 
M&A-s may be considered as competition among oligopolistic firms in taking advantage of 
different opportunities. 
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There is a direct relation between the degree of international involvement and firm value, as 
suggested in Errunza and Senbet, 1981; Errunza and Senbet, 1984 and Kim and Lyn, 1986. 
They show that excess firm value is positively related to the growth in the degree of 
international involvement and that this relationship is stronger during periods with greater 
financial barriers. 
Various theories are empirically tested by Mørck and Yeung, 1991: internalization theory, 
imperfect capital markets theory, agency theory. The results support internalization theory 
but engaging in international diversification per se does not impact significantly firm value.  
Internalization suggests that international diversification is advisable when firms benefit from 
internalizing markets for intangible assets with high proprietary information such as superior 
production skills, patents, marketing abilities, managerial skills, or consumer goodwill 
(Caves, 1971; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991).  
Froot and Stein, 1989, propose a model in which acquirers will have an advantage if their 
currency is stronger relative to the currency in the target's country. More recently, Harris and 
Ravenscraft, 1991, found that the effect of international diversification on shareholder value 
is positively related to the weakness of the U.S. dollar, demonstrating that exchange rate has 
a major role in foreign direct investment. 
Tax avoidance and low cost inputs are also considered to be reasons for engaging in merging 
activities (Scholes & Wolfson, 1990). The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act increased tax 
incentives for takeovers by U.S. firms, while the 1986 Tax Reform Act neutralized them.  
More recent data samples yielded, however, a negative return for shareholder value. Datta 
and Puia, 1995, reached the conclusion that overall cross-border M&A-s do not create value 
for the bidder’s shareholders. They took into consideration industry relatedness which gave 
unclear results, as well as cultural fit. High cultural differences between countries lead to 
lower abnormal returns for acquiring firm shareholders. 
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Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop, 2003, found evidence of positive excess values for 
multinational corporations while Christophe, 1997, and Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002, using 
the same methodology, found evidence that international diversification had a negative 
impact on acquiring firm shareholders. In a more recent study Dos Santos, Errunza and 
Miller, 2008, found inconclusive effects of international diversification through M&A-s after 
controlling for the pre-acquisition value of the target. 
Cakici,  Hessel and Tandon, 1996, examine shareholder wealth gains for 195 foreign firms 
that acquired U.S. target firms during 1983-92 in comparison to 112 deals US firms that 
acquired non-US firms. The result was that foreign acquirers have positive and significant 
excess returns while U.S. acquiring firms destroy value in their purchases of foreign firms 
over the same period. Interestingly, they found opposite evidence from some of the earlier 
studies associated with relative size of target to bidder, extent of overseas exposure, R & D 
intensity, industry factors and value of foreign currency. Bidder abnormal returns are not 
related to any of these factors. 
Seth, Song and Pettit, 2002, analyzed sources of gains and losses in cross-border 
acquisitions. In their view different results were a consequence of failing to take into 
consideration the motives for each acquisition. They concluded that deals are value creating 
if they are done in order to benefit form synergies and value-destroying if they are done 
because of managerialism or management hubris. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005, found that deals done between 1998 and 2001 lost 
approximately $240 bn. and $7 bn. in the 1980’s. The aggregate loss between 1998 and 2001 
is so large because of a small number of failed acquisitions made by firms with extremely 
high valuations. Excluding these, the rest of the acquisitions would have been, on average, 
value creating for acquiring-firm shareholders.  
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3.2. Theoretical Perspectives on International M&A-s as a Value Creating 
Strategy 
Prior research in the field of value creation through mergers and acquisitions are based on 
assumptions that impact the results of an empirical study, among which are worth 
mentioning: transaction cost economics (TCE), organizational learning, macroeconomics 
theory, agency theory, resource based view (RBV), managerialism, industrial organization 
economics and `national cultural differences. A theoretical perspective usually integrates two 
or more of these assumptions, depending on the question being asked in the study. 
3.2.1. Transaction Cost Economics Perspective 
When transaction-specific assets are likely to become valuable, firms are better off 
integrating a certain function according to transaction cost economics (see Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986).  
Using a TCE framework, Morck and Yeung, 1992 found positive and significant abnormal 
returns for US acquiring firms with characteristics suggesting the presence of information-
based assets. These assets, represented by research and development (R&D), advertising and 
management quality allowed the bidders to internalize the assets of the target firms more 
efficiently. Via the same theoretical perspective but considering US firms as targets instead 
of acquirers, Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991 established that R&D intensive industries have 
more international merger activity than domestic merger activity. Deals in related industries 
account for three-fourths of cross-border acquisitions. When foreign buyers are involved in 
the mergers, US target firms have significantly higher abnormal returns than when bidders 
are from US. Exchange rates seem to influence the level of value creation, while tax variables 
yielded an inconclusive result. In a study performed by Servaes in 1991, a strong relation was 
found between targets with low q ratios and bidders with high q ratios on one hand, and 
target and bidder returns on the other hand. Finally, Li and Guisinger, 1991 and Nitsch, 
Beamish and Makino, 1996 found that acquisitions and joint ventures are not only less 
performing, but also more likely to fail than Greenfield investments. 
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3.2.2. Organizational Learning Perspective 
Large firms often acquire small, know-how based companies in order to get access to new 
knowledge. However, many acquisitions fail to deliver the expected results, as the parties 
involved do not seem to adapt accordingly. 
Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996, found that foreign ventures last longer the smaller the 
cultural difference between the home and the host country. 
3.2.3 Macroeconomics Theory 
Taxation system and the exchange rate movements seem to have the greatest influence of all 
macroeconomic factors, on the wealth effects deriving from mergers. 
In an empirical study of acquisitions made by 202 U.S. firms between 1975– 1983, Manzon, 
Sharp and Travlos, 1994 found that if the target firm has a high-tax system, U.S. acquirers 
have higher abnormal returns than if they acquire a target from a low-tax country. 
3.2.4. Agency Theory  
One of the aspects of agency theory consists of the fact that higher debt supposedly reduces 
potential agency costs (Jensen, 1986). 
Transaction cost economics and agency theory perspective were used by Kang, 1993 to study 
the financial characteristics of bidders. Using a sample of 119 Japanese bidders and 102 
corresponding U.S. targets from 1975 to 1988, he found that Japanese acquisitions are value 
creating for both bidder and target firm shareholders. Total acquirer’s debt and borrowings 
from financial institutions were reported to be positively correlated to the abnormal return to 
acquiring firm. Furthermore the appreciation of the acquirer’s currency compared with the 
target’s currency leads to higher wealth effects for the bidder. 
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3.2.5. Resource Based View and Managerialism Perspective 
Resource-based view and managerialism perspective were used by Seth, Song and Pettit, 
2002 to study the acquisition motive as a factor that influences value creation in cross border 
M&A-s. The findings were that wealth enhancing deals were done in order to benefit from 
synergies deriving form sharing complementary assets, reverse internalizing of intangible 
assets and reducing financial risk by financial diversification. In contrast, value destroying 
acquisitions were a consequence of incorrect target evaluation supported by managers that 
followed their personal interest rather than the shareholders interest. 
3.2.6. Industrial Organization Economics 
According to the industrial organization model, firm returns are determined by the industry 
structure, explained by the existence and value of barriers to entry, the number and relative 
size of firms, the existence and degree of product differentiation in the industry and the 
overall elasticity of demand for the industry. 
Via TCE and industrial organization theoretical perspectives, Markides and Ittner, 1994 show 
that, on average, international M&A-s are value creating and that the wealth gains depends 
on whether the firms are in related industries or not, consolidation level and advertising 
intensity of the acquirer’s industry, prior international experience of bidder and its current 
profitability, tax, regulations, strength of acquirer’s currency.  
3.2.7. National Cultural Differences Perspective 
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber, 1992 concluded that there is a negative 
correlation between shareholder abnormal returns of the firms involved in related mergers 
and the level of cultural distance between the combining companies. 
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3.2.8. An Integrative Perspective (Transaction Cost Economics, Resource Based View 
and National Cultural Differences)  
Opposite conclusions from those reported above were drawn by Datta and Puia, 1995. For a 
slightly different sample period (1978–1990), they concluded that acquiring firm 
shareholders of companies engaged in international M&A-s do not create value as compared 
to domestic deals. It is not clear whether industry relatedness of the target and the buyer 
influences the value created by the acquirer, but the cultural difference between the countries 
of the two firms has a negative effect. The intuition for these results is that Datta and Puia 
used a relatively more recent sample compared to other studies that found value creation for 
both acquirer and target firms shareholders. One possible explanation is that globalization 
reduces the economic differences between countries and therefore reduces the benefits of 
making international acquisition such as tax effects or financial risk reduction. 
3.3. Do Cross-Border M&As Create More Value than Domestic Deals? 
It is argued that the market reacts differently to international than to domestic M&A-s. 
Domestic mergers empirically tested by Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992 are reported to diminish 
the acquirer shareholders wealth and increase the shareholder value for the target. On the 
other hand, acquirers purchasing non-US firms seem to be better off. Markides and Ittner, 
1994 show that, on average, international M&A-s are value creating and that the wealth gains 
depends on whether the firms are in related industries or not, consolidation level and 
advertising intensity of the acquirer’s industry, prior international experience of bidder and 
its current profitability, tax, regulations, strength of acquirer’s currency. Mørck and Yeung, 
1991 demonstrate that firms engaging in international diversification can be value creating 
only if firms can internalize markets. Furthermore, Kang, 1993 demonstrates that 
international bidders gain more than US bidders engaged in acquiring an US target.   
On the other hand, Fatemi, 1984 studies purely domestic firms as compared to multinational 
companies. He demonstrates the risk-adjusted returns realized by the shareholders are 
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identical across the two groups, except where the multinational company operates in 
competitive foreign markets.  
Doukas and Travlos, 1988, show that international acquisitions can be value creating or not 
depending on the existence of previous activities in the target country and whether the 
company expand internationally for the first time. 
A study by Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991, suggests that costs and imperfections in product 
markets play an important role in foreign direct investment and as an effect international 
M&A-s are value creating. The results of the study also show that target shareholders of 
buyers from outside the U.S. gain significantly higher returns than do target shareholders of 
U.S. firms. 
Overall, international M&A-s seem to be better performing than domestic ones. Not only the 
acquirer shareholders might experience an increase in wealth, but also the target shareholders 
gain more if they are engaged in an international merger. 
3.4. Critical View on Previous Research 
Previous studies in the field have yielded mixed and sometimes contradicting results. We are 
trying to evaluate how the methodology applied and the sample used influence the results. 
It can be observed that the oldest articles focus more on explaining through economic theory 
(macroeconomic in general, equilibrium analysis and introduction of imperfections in an 
equilibrium framework) how the degree of international involvement should influence the 
returns of the companies (Caves, 1971; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Errunza and Senbert, 
1981; Errunza and Senbert, 1984; Froot and Stein, 1989). Some empirical findings are 
presented in order to support the theories but in general the focus is on developing models. 
The theories can be considered strategies for multinationals (Caves, 1971; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Wilson 1980) in order to establish the speed of internationalization, the 
tradeoffs between product diversification and foreign market penetration or the means of 
diversifying internationally (through greenfield investments or M&As). 
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The following research tested existence of abnormal returns for companies diversified 
internationally in a static framework (not over time before and after the announcement of 
international diversification) trying to determine whether multinationals are more valuable 
than domestic firms and how the degree of international involvement influence the returns to 
investors (Errunza and Senbert, 1981; Errunza and Senbert, 1984; Kim and Lyn, 1986). This 
studies tested the 1970’s cross-border diversification and concluded that it is value creating. 
They made use of excess value measures such as the ratio (market value of equity – net 
worth)/sales and market to book ratio. It can be concluded multinationals are more valuable 
than domestic firms but do not determine if each act of diversifying is value creating or not. 
It can be the case that a multinational company is more valuable than a domestic one but it 
destroys value for shareholders with the new acquisitions it makes.  
Starting form the moment when scholars begun to test the reactions on the market when 
diversifying internationally was announced, the event study (using Fama’s market model to 
determine the abnormal return) methodology was the most favoured (Fatemi, 1984; Doukas 
and Travlos, 1988 and most of the 1990’s except for example the study of Mork and Yeung, 
1991; Christophe, 1997). Event study was combined with regression analysis in order to 
control for different variables such as international tax system (Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; 
Markides and Ittner, 1994), leverage (Kang, 1993; Markides and Ittner, 1994), currency 
strength (Harris and Ravenschaft, 1991; Kang, 1993), R&D (Markides and Ittner, 1994) and 
cultural difference (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber, 1992; Barkema, Bell and 
Pennings, 1996). Even though different event windows were used, the results mainly 
confirmed that international diversification is value enhancing for the sample comprising of 
deals in the 1970’s. For 1980’s beginning of 1990’s there are conflicting results as a 
consequence of the fact the sample periods vary (Datta and Puia, 1995; Christohe, 1997 show 
value destruction). It can be assumed that the newer the deals there are fewer imperfections 
in the market that would yield an abnormal return. 
The studies from 1990’s do not generally differentiate between industrial and international 
diversification and those that initially do (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992) found no difference 
between the returns to related acquisitions versus the returns to unrelated acquisitions. 
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Empirical studies conducted in the last decade focus on sample periods that include the 
1990’s (the fifth merger wave) and exhibit some common particularities (Denis, Denis and 
Yost, 2002; Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop, 2003; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005; Dos 
Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008). The distinction between geographical and industrial 
diversification is more carefully analyzed, as these two approaches are found to yield 
different results for the first time2. On average, their results show that geographical 
diversification of firms does not create or destroy any value relative to a benchmark of un-
diversified companies, whereas industrial diversification leads to value discounts relative to a 
benchmark of single-industry companies. The intuition for these results is that the sample 
period examined was characterized by an increase in both the extent and the incidence of 
geographical diversification and by the opposite trend for industrial diversification, due to the 
fact that it had repeatedly proven to be value-destroying.  
 
Another common ground for the analyzed studies is that they focus more on the medium-to-
long term effects of mergers and acquisitions on firm shareholders value. Instead of just 
measuring the announcement effect on stock price a few days before and after the event takes 
place, researchers are now more interested in studying how the companies perform up to 3 
years surrounding the acquisition. Consequently, methodologies based on excess return 
measures are used instead of standard event study. Excess-market-value-of-equity to sales 
ratio, market-to-book value of assets or market value to imputed value ratio are used as 
proxies for measuring excess values. 
 
Taking into account these particularities in the methodologies used and in the factors most 
likely to influence the results, value creation through M&A-s was found, on average, for the 
sample period 1990-1997. However, from 1998 to 2001 large losses occurred in acquiring-
firm shareholders wealth as a result of a small number of acquisitions with extremely large 
losses that exceed many times the losses in the first part of the 1990’s. The intuition behind 
these findings is the large number of overvalued targets that were taken over during 1998-
 
2 Kaplan and Weisbach 1992 previously tested the impact of industrial diversification on firm value, but found 
that cumulative average abnormal returns around the events of related and unrelated mergers are not 
significantly different from each other. 
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2001, especially companies in the Software industry. The value lost through acquisitions that 
took place during 1998-2001 cancels out the positive result until 2007, resulting in an overall 
wealth-destroying fifth merger wave. 
 
To our knowledge, no empirical studies have been conducted yet on the most recent sixth 
merger wave that involve European acquirer companies who geographically diversify in the 
U.S. Our paper would therefore analyse the wealth-effect of these mergers on both acquirer 
and target shareholders using a methodology based on the excess value measure, explained in 
the following chapters. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used in order to perform the empirical study. The 
data collection process, the excess value measures and the regression variables are 
presented further. 
 
4.1. Research Approach  
There are two general research approaches: deductive and inductive. The deductive approach 
develops a theory and designs the research to test the previously-mentioned theory; the 
inductive approach develops theories as a result of data analysis (Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill, 
2003). 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to determine to what extent cross-border mergers are 
value-creating. The secondary goal is to establish the influence of different factors previously 
mentioned by the literature in this field, on the wealth creation. Therefore, as different 
theories regarding mergers and acquisitions are being tested in this study, a deductive 
approach will be employed. 
In order to reach these goals, both quantitative and qualitative data is used.  The quantitative 
information is used to objectively test the hypothesis and perform descriptive statistics. In 
order to have a thorough overview of the results that takes into consideration the contextual 
details, qualitative information is also analyzed, such as the cultural difference between 
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acquirer and target. The impact of the cultural difference on the value created by acquirers is 
controlled for by introducing it as an exogenous variable in the regression3.  
4.2. Data Collection 
All the data used is secondary data gathered from the databases Thomson Reuters3000 and 
DataStream.  
The list of mergers and acquisitions and the geographical diversification status of the 
companies we include in the benchmark are obtained from Reuters3000 database. Share-
price and accounting data (Number of shares, Book value of Debt, Preferred stock, Sales, 
Total Assets, Leverage, R&D expenses and CAPEX) before and after the merger are 
obtained from DataStream database for each company. Acquirer and target companies with 
no data available - private companies or simply without information in DataStream are 
disregarded. Both acquirers and foreign target firms operating in the financial, real estate and 
investment sectors are excluded, since they have certain particularities in terms of balance 
sheet structure and financing procedures. 
Data on completed mergers from 1999 to 2007 with acquirers from Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom, and with US targets is collected (representing an initial sample of 3135 
M&A-s). 
The sample period (1999-2007) is explained mainly by the availability of data on M&A-s in 
Reuters3000 that does not go earlier than 1999 and by the fact that the latest studies in this 
field (see, for example, Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008) examined the period 1990-
2000. Therefore, it has come to our awareness that no studies have been made on mergers 
and acquisitions initiated in the last decade. The sample period ends in 2007 because 
 
3 We will explain this concept in detail in subchapter 4.5. 
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accounting data is required for both acquirer and target one year after the acquisition and 
annual reports are available only up to 2008. 
 Our choice of acquirer countries is motivated by the fact that we initially wanted to consider 
only developed European countries (for availability of data purposes) that have adopted the 
EURO currency. Because our final sample would have been too small (only 66 completed 
M&As with share price and accounting data available for both acquirer and target 
companies), we also included mergers with acquirers from Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom.  
Starting from the initial sample of all completed acquisitions announced during 1999 and 
2007 (3135 firms) we considered the acquisitions for which both acquirer and target were 
publicly traded and were not operating in the financial, investment and real estate sectors. 
This reduced the sample to a number of 128 observations. We further disregard 10 other 
mergers for which the acquirer’s industry was defined as “conglomerate industrials” as we 
are studying only the deals for which the acquirer and target have the same core industry.  
Six acquisitions (one from industrial machinery industry in United Kingdom, one from 
communications equipment industry in United Kingdom, two from software & computer 
services industry in United Kingdom and Germany and two from advertising industry in 
United Kingdom and Netherlands) are disregarded because of the lack of accounting data. 
From the 113 remaining deals one merger in the software & computer services industry in 
Germany is left out because its value is considerably lower than the rest of the acquisitions. 
This led to a final sample of 112 M&A-s with acquirers from developed European countries 
that diversify in the US.  
It can be noticed that the few left out acquisitions are from different industries. Even though 
most of them are from United Kingdom, this country is still well represented in our final 
sample. Given the above stated remarks, we consider that the missing data will not influence 
our results significantly. 
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One particular problem that we are concerned about regarding the data sample is selection 
bias. Screening the companies present in our initial sample according to whether complete 
stock price and accounting data can be found for them in DataStream led to a number of 
3023 M&A-s being left out (total sample 3135 firms minus final sample 112 firms). It also 
led to one country being excluded from our sample altogether, as no merger that involved an 
acquirer from Austria with both acquirer and target publicly traded was found4. We are 
worried that the missing deals may cause measures of statistical significance to appear much 
stronger than they are. However, the ratio of the number of M&A-s included in the final 
sample divided by the initial number of M&A-s is similar for every country (around 3%), 
therefore the heterogeneity problem is avoided. Moreover, this problem is common in 
previous studies in the field of M&A-s, because of accounting data scarcity.   
The benchmark used in calculating Excess Values5 is made up of companies from the same 
countries as the acquirers (developed European countries) that have not geographically 
diversified in the US up until 2007. This aspect is verified by checking the geographical 
diversification status available in Reuters3000, of every company that will potentially be 
included in the benchmark. One company was chosen from every industry in every country 
of the acquirers (the industry of the acquirer and the target is the same) and only companies 
with complete data are included in the final benchmark, which led to a number of 132 firms 
(11 industries multiplied by 12 acquirer countries) and 1188 firm-years.  For each of these 
firms, data such as exchange rate, share-price and accounting information (Number of shares, 
Book value of Debt, Preferred stock, Sales, Total Assets, Leverage, R&D expenses and 
CAPEX) is collected from DataStream database. 
4.3. Criticism of Data Sources 
The secondary data used (share-price, accounting data, exchange rate) is all gathered from 
DataStream, which is an established database. The validity of this database can be proven by 
the fact that it is common for researchers to use this source to collect information for their 
 
4 We initially considered Austria in our study as one of the acquirer country 
5 This concept will be explained further in subchapter 4.4. 
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empirical studies. Reuters3000, used for identifying mergers and acquisitions and the 
geographical diversification status of benchmark companies, is an important international 
source for company data.     
4.4. Calculating Excess Values 
Most studies in the field of value creation trough mergers and acquisitions employ a standard 
event study methodology in order to measure the impact of acquisition announcements on 
shareholder wealth. The announcement of a merger between two firms is analyzed to see 
whether investors believe the merger will create or destroy value. The present paper is 
different in the sense that it aims at observing the change in excess value of acquirers and 
targets one year following the acquisition compared to one year prior to the acquisition. We 
base our methodology on the one used by Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008, which 
represents a variation of the multiplier approach originally developed by Berger and Ofek, 
1995. 
This value measure is mainly chosen because it controls for the geographical diversification 
effects on firm value. Morck and Yeung, 1991, and Lang and Stulz, 1994, employ a different 
methodology, the market-to-book ratio, which is a close proxy for Tobin’s q. This approach 
is limited in controlling for geographical diversification effects and poorly examines the 
potential sources of gains or losses from diversification. Markides and Ittner, 1994, use a 
standard event study methodology to determine shareholder benefits from corporate 
international diversification. The drawback of this approach is that it is difficult to clearly 
identify investors’ attitudes about diversification by examining an announcement- date stock 
price response.  
On the other hand, a weakness of the excess value approach that we employ is its increased 
sensitivity to the choice of benchmark. This can cause a potential reliability problem, in the 
sense that if a different benchmark is chosen, the results could be significantly different from 
ours. 
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4.4.1. General Principles for Computing Excess Value  
The excess value (EV) compares a firm’s market value to its imputed value (IV) and it is 
calculated by taking the natural logarithm of the ratio of market to imputed value. 
EV = Ln (
ti ,
ti
ti
IV
MV
,
, )           (1) 
A company’s market value is obtained by adding to the market value of common equity the 
book value of total debt plus the liquidating value of preferred stock. The imputed value is 
equal to the amount of sales of a firm (w ) multiplied by the median of the total market 
value -to-sales ratio (
ti ,
tθ ) of the companies included in the benchmark.   
IV = wti , ti , tθ  = w (Median(ti , 1θ , 2θ , … tk ,θ ))       (2) 
The benchmark is made up of companies from the same countries as the acquirers (developed 
European countries) that have not geographically diversified in the US up until 2007. The 
final benchmark consists of 132 firms (1188 firm-years), one from every industry of the 
acquirer/target and from every country of the acquirer, in order to have a representative 
benchmark. Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008, were interested in studying the effect of 
both industrial and geographical diversification on firm value and therefore obtain their 
median multipliers from single-activity domestic firms only. Our study is only focusing on 
the geographical diversification effect on firm value, and this is why the benchmark is less 
restrictive, including firms from all industries of the acquirers/targets that have not yet 
diversified in the US. 
The excess value measure will have a value of less than zero if the market value of the firm is 
less than the imputed market capitalization based upon the median market value-to-sales ratio 
of the geographically not-diversified firms included in the benchmark. This suggests that a 
firm is less valuable than it would be had it not internationally diversified across the Atlantic.  
Similarly, the measure will have a positive value if the market value of the firm is more than 
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the imputed value. This indicates that a firm creates more value for its shareholders than it 
would if it didn’t geographically diversify in the US. 
4.4.2. Excess Value of the Acquiring Firms’ Shareholders 
The unexplained change in excess value (Δ EV ) measures the additional value gain or 
loss (or nothing) that occurs beyond the effect of adding overvalued or undervalued (or 
“fairly valued”) target firms to the acquiring firms. We can measure the unexplained change 
in excess values of the U.S. acquirers based on the actual change in excess values (
U
1+
Δ EV ), 
and the projected change in excess values (
1+
Δ EV  ), as follows: P 1+
Δ EV U = EV - EV = EV - EV        (3) 
1+ Δ 1+ Δ P 1+ 1+ P 1+
The actual change in excess values from year t = -1 to year t = + 1 ( EV ) equals the 
difference between the excess value (EV) for U.S. acquirers in the year following (EV ) and 
the year prior to (EV ) the acquisition.  
Δ 1+
1+
1−
The projected change in excess value (Δ EV ) is calculated as the difference between the 
projected excess value (EV ) and EV  . The projected excess value represents the excess 
value the merging firms would have if they combined their operations instantaneously in the 
year prior to the actual acquisition and is calculated as follows: 
P
1+
P
1+ 1−
EV = Ln(P 1+ TgAcq
TgAcq
IVIV
MVMV
11
11
−−
−−
+
+
)         (4) 
where and stand for the market values of the U.S. acquiring and the foreign 
target firms at t = –1, respectively, while and are their corresponding imputed 
values. 
AcqMV 1−
TgMV 1−
AcqIV 1−
TgIV 1−
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Once we compute EV , we then compare it to the excess value of the U.S. acquiring firm 
in the year prior to the acquisition (EV ) in order to compute the projected change in excess 
value. 
P
1+
1−
4.4.3. Excess Value of the Target Firms’ Shareholders 
In order to determine to what extent corporate international diversification creates value for 
the target firm’s shareholders, we calculate two measures of excess value for the target firms 
in their last year of operations as stand-alone firms. 
The first measure is the pre-effective excess value (EV ) and is computed using the 
market value of common equity based on the last stock price available prior to the date on 
which the target firm is delisted. The second measure represents the preannouncement excess 
value (EV ) and is calculated using the market value of common equity observed one 
month before the announcement of the acquisition. Unlike the first measure, it does not 
incorporate the valuation effects due to the acquisition announcement. 
1−
E
1−
A
Thus, the foreign target shareholders’ wealth associated with the cross-border acquisition 
( ) equals the difference between EV and EV  (Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 
2008). 
1−ΔEV 1− E 1− A
4.5. Constructing the Regression 
Further the relationship between excess value of acquirer (∆EV ) and the excess value of 
the target firm as part of the projected change in excess value (
1+
Δ EV ) is analyzed using a 
cross-sectional regression framework. Consequently it can be concluded how much of the 
actual change in excess values is determined by the projected change in excess values or 
other factors. 
P
1+
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4.5.1. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the actual change in excess value (∆EV ) of the acquirer one year 
after the merger as determined using the methodology presented above. 
1+
4.5.2. The Explanatory Variables 
Diversification literature uses the following variables to assess the geographical 
diversification effect: R&D as a proxy for firm specific assets and leverage as a proxy for any 
financial benefit from being internationally diversified. Profitability, growth opportunities 
and firm size are used in measuring the industrial diversification effect.  (Bodnar, Tang and 
Weintrop, 2003). We are not going to evaluate the industrial diversification in our study and 
as a result we are not going to use the variables that are considered to be of importance to this 
issue. 
Since the dependent variable is a relative measure, we also measure the corporate control 
variables in relative terms (Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop, 2003). Thus, our corporate control 
variables (R&D/Sales and leverage) are measured relative to the value of the benchmark in 
the year prior to acquisition. 
The explanatory variables are: the projected change in excess value (∆EVP ), the cultural 
difference (CD), the strength of the acquirer’s currency (STR), R&D/Sales of the acquirer 
relative to the benchmark (RD), leverage (L) of the acquirer relative to benchmark and a 
dummy to account for overvaluation of the target. 
1+
The projected change in excess value (∆EVP ) is computed as shown in subchapter 4.4.2. 1+
Cultural difference (CD) is determined using one of the fourth cultural measures from 
Hofstede, 1980: power distance index (PDI), uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), 
individualism index (IDV) and masculinity index (MAS). Because these variables are highly 
collinear (Markides and Ittner, 1994) we are going to use just one of these variables – power 
distance index (PDI). 
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The power distance is an issue of human equality. Status differential exist in all societies and 
PDI measures the extent to which the less powerful members of any type of organization 
accept and expect that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 1980). We consider this 
index to be the most representative in our case as the integration process following a merger 
is an issue of changing the hierarchy and integrating the new company into the organization. 
As a consequence the bigger the cultural difference the harder it is to integrate the new 
company and for employees to accept the new authority. If a company is not fully integrated 
in the organization it is expected that it would be value destroying as it cannot be fully 
supervised and it cannot benefit from synergies deriving from integration. 
The index is a country’s score following a questionnaire. The question that most clearly 
expresses power distance is: “How often in your experience does the following problem 
occur: employees being afraid to express disagreement with the manager?” (Hofstede, 1980). 
This is a question of people being concerned to express their own views, the higher the PDI 
score the more concerned people are.    
Low PDI cultures favour less centralization, flatter organization pyramids, smaller proportion 
of superiority personnel, smaller wage difference. In low PDI cultures managers often make 
decisions after consulting with subordinates, close supervision is negatively evaluated by 
subordinates and employees are less afraid of disagreeing with their boss (Hofstede, 1980). 
Table 4.1 presents the scores for each country that is of interest to the present study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value Creation through Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions. 
An Empirical Study on European Acquirers of US Targets 
 
 
 44
Table 4.1: Power Distance Index  
 Country  PDI 
Belgium 65 
Denmark 18 
Finland 33 
France 68 
Germany 35 
Italy 50 
Luxembourg 38 
Netherlands 38 
Norway 31 
Spain 57 
Sweden 31 
United Kingdom 35 
US 40 
Source: Geert Hofstede, Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values, Beverly 
Hills: Sage, 1980 
 
 
PDI depends on education level, social class difference, gender, occupation, sexual 
orientation, personal achievements, family background, wealth, age, if respondents are 
parents or not, national environment, economic development of the country. Low PDI values 
appear for example for highly educated occupations in low PDI countries. 
We compute the cultural distance (see Table 4.2) as the (absolute) difference between the 
acquirer’s country PDI and US PDI. 
 
Table 4.2: Cultural Difference – Normal Difference and Absolute Difference  
Country  CD 
Belgium 25
Denmark 22
Finland 7
France 28
Germany 5
Italy 10
Luxembourg 2
Netherlands 2
Norway 9
Spain 17
Sweden 9
United Kingdom 5
Source: Geert Hofstede, Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values, Beverly 
Hills: Sage, 1980 
Country  CD 
Belgium 25 
Denmark -22 
Finland -7 
France 28 
Germany -5 
Italy 10 
Luxembourg -2 
Netherlands -2 
Norway -9 
Spain 17 
Sweden -9 
United Kingdom -5 
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We can observe cultural clustering: there are countries with large cultural difference - 
positive difference as Belgium and France and negative difference Denmark; and countries 
with small and negative difference: Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
As we are interested in just the cultural difference in general whether the difference between 
the PDI is positive or negative is irrelevant and can distort the results. Therefore the absolute 
difference is going to be used in the regression analysis. 
The strength of the acquirer’s currency (STR) is expressed by a dummy variable. The 
following graphs (Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2) show the pattern of exchange rates during 1999 
– 2007. We can observe a correlation between exchange rates (USD/DKK, USD/NOK and 
USD/SEK). In general they all increase in the first period, the dollar reaching a maximum in 
July 2001, then the exchange rates decrease reaching the lowest point in January 2005. It 
follows a short period of raise in values of the exchange rates until December 2005. After 
that the downward trend continues, the dollar getting weaker over the time.    
Figure 4.1: Pattern of Exchange Rates: USD/DKK, USD/NOK and USD/SEK 
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Data source: Datastream 
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We present USD/EUR and USD/GBP on a separate graph for a clear view. The time intervals 
are roughly the same. The first peak is in June 2001 and it is followed by a downward trend 
that temporarily bottoms out in December 2004. The following vague increase in exchange 
rate values ends in December 2005. Afterwards the dollar is getting weaker and the other 
currencies stronger. 
Figure 4.2: Pattern of exchange rates: USD/EUR and USD/GBP 
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Data source: Datastream 
As long as the exchange rate USD/XXX increases, the dollar values more and more, being 
stronger. Thus the other currency is weaker during the period of increase in exchange rates. 
We set the value for the dummy variable 0 when the acquirer currency is weaker and the 
dollar stronger and 1 for the other case. 
For the Nordic countries we have the following results presented in Table 4.3: 
Table 4.3: Strength of DKK, NOK and SEK relative to USD - dummy variable 
DUMMY PERIOD
0 January 1999 -July 2001
1 August 2001 - January 2005
0 February 2005 - December 2005
1 January 2006 - December 2007  
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The results for EUR and GBP are showed in Table 4.4: 
Table 4.4: Strength of EUR and GBP relative to USD - dummy variable 
DUMMY PERIOD
0 January 1999 -June 2001
1 July 2001 - December 2004
0 January 2005 - December 2005
1 January 2006 - December 2007  
For each merger we are going to consider the strength of the acquirer’s currency as it is at the 
moment of the announcement. 
R&D/Sales (RD) is the difference between the acquirer R&D expenditures to sales ratio in 
the year prior to the announcement and the mean of R&D expenditures to sales ratio of the 
benchmark firms in the year prior to the announcement. 
Leverage (L) is the difference between acquirer leverage one year prior to the announcement 
and the mean leverage of the benchmark firms one year prior to the announcement. 
Overvaluation of the target (OV) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 
excess value of the target at t-1 is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. We use this dummy in 
order to control for the overvaluation of the target6. The initial regression is re-estimated in 
order to determine if adding a fairly (under) valued firm is viewed by investors as a way of 
improving their wealth       
4.5.3. The regression. 
 The following regression is tested in EViews: 
Initial regression: ∆EV+1, i = α + β1*∆EVP+1, i + β2*CDi + β3*STRi + β4*RDi + β5*Li + εi   (5) 
Controlling for target overvaluation:  
∆EV+1, i = α + β1*∆EVP+1, i + β2*CDi + β3*STRi + β4*RDi + β5*Li + β6*OVi+ εi   (6) 
                                                 
6 As we will show in subchapter 5.2.3 the US targets are overvalued compared to the benchmark. 
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where:  
- α illustrates if the merger is value creating beyond just adding a new company or a fairly/ 
undervalued subsidiary when we control for overvaluation of the target . If estimated α is 
greater than zero and significant then mergers increase the wealth of the acquirer 
shareholders, if it is smaller than zero and significant than mergers are value destroying, if α 
is statistically insignificant then the mergers do not destroy or add value beyond the value of 
the target. Α is correspondent to the unexplained change in excess value presented in chapter 
4.5 and it accounts for synergies resulting from the merger. 
- β1 shows how much of the change in excess value is determined by the projected change 
in excess value. It is anticipated that β has a positive sign.  
- β2 explains the influence of cultural difference. It is expected to have a negative sign 
- β3 accounts for the influence of acquirer’s currency strength and we expect it to be 
positive. 
- β4 quantifies the influence of firm specific assets. We anticipate that it has a positive 
value. 
- β5 measures the influence of acquirer’s leverage on the wealth creation and we expect it 
to have a positive sign 
- β6 shows the influence of overvaluation of the target. The sign of the coefficient is 
expected to be negative 
- ε represents the residuals. 
The multi-collinearity problem should not appear as the variables are anticipated to be 
uncorrelated. However this problem will be tested using the correlation matrix of the 
explanatory variables. 
One problem that was reported by previous studies is the self-selection problem. This 
problem appears to be important only for geographical diversification. Self-selection means 
that if the initial values of acquirers are systematically different from the benchmark firms, 
then the effect on value determined using excess value measures do not represent the true 
impacts of diversification. If firms that diversify geographically were originally high value 
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firms then the results would exaggerate the value impact of diversification (Bodnar, Tang and 
Weintrop, 2003). Using the regression analysis and measuring the actual change in excess 
value as related to the projected change in excess value we control for that problem. Thus α 
would be a correspondent to the measure calculated in equation (3), the unexplained change 
in excess value. 
4.6 Methodological Problems 
When determining the impact of the results of it is important to consider two concepts: 
validity and reliability. Validity addresses the question: “does the research truly measures 
what it is intended to measure?” while reliability concerns the possibility of reproducing the 
results under the same methodology (Joppe, 2000).  
4.6.1. Validity 
Validity has two essential aspects: internal and external. Internal validity refers to the 
legitimacy of the results considering the way groups were selected, data collected, analysis 
performed. In this case the study can be considered internally valid as the data were all 
collected from the same database, using the same methodology. Even though some 
observations were disregarded because of lack of accounting or share-price information the 
sample is large enough to give representative results.  
External validity also called “generalizability” assumes that the outcome of a study can be 
generalized to other groups, samples. On average the result of this study can be supposed to 
hold for European acquirers diversifying in the US. For other groups of countries, during 
other periods the result may differ due to different economical conditions, cultural 
background or choice of benchmark firms.  
4.6.2. Reliability  
The reliability is defined by Joppe, 2000, as the extent to which results are consistent over 
time. Assuming the same initial conditions for a study, the same results should be obtained 
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every time for the test to be considered reliable. In order to determine the reliability of our 
study, two main aspects are considered: the reliability of the collected data and of the 
methods used. 
Data was collected from the databases Reuters and Datastream, which are known to contain 
reliable information. In order to make sure of this aspect, some observations were cross 
referenced between the sources and were found to be correct. The firm specific information 
on both Reuters and Datastream originates from companies’ external reporting, which is 
reliable, or at least the best proxy for information available to external investors. 
Furthermore, only companies that use IFRS or US GAAP regulative frameworks to file their 
annual reports were included in the study, which increases the reliability of our data. The 
number of observations also influences data reliability. Our data consists of 112 observations, 
which is similar to what other studies in the field have used. Taking into account that all 
public available data for the particular countries of our interest are collected, we consider our 
data reliable from this perspective as well. 
The excess value measure may contain reliability problems, as some assumptions have been 
made which need to be kept in mind by other researchers conducting this study. All 
accounting data for the year previous to the acquisition (t-1) and the year following the 
acquisition (t+1) is end-of-the-year data, as not all companies have quarterly reports available 
on DataStream. Also, the excess value measure is very sensitive to the choice of benchmark, 
so including different companies in the benchmark may lead to significantly different results. 
The regression is run using OLS in the econometrics software EViews, a well used tool 
within statistical research. For OLS to present a correct result, certain assumptions have to be 
fulfilled. To control for these conditions a number of residual tests have been performed. 
This leads us to believe that OLS is an appropriate model in our case and that the results are 
reliable. 
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results from the study performed. A description of the 
sample distribution and deal characteristics is presented first. A comparison of the firm 
characteristics is performed in order to assess the difference between acquirer before and 
after the merger, between acquirer and target and between target and benchmark firms. 
Afterwards the excess value measures are evaluated. A regression analysis is used to verify 
our initial results and control for corporate variables, cultural difference and strength of the 
acquirer currency.  
 
5.1. Sample Distribution and Deal Characteristics 
Our final sample consists of 112 acquisitions. Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for 
the overall sample. Cross border acquisitions are rather large deals with a mean value of $1.9 
bn. and a median value of $498 mil. The smallest acquisition values $2.3 mil., while the 
largest values $24.9 bn. 
Table 5.1: Sample deal characteristics 
  Mean (USD) Median (USD) Minimum (USD) Maximum (USD) 
Deal Value 1,974,885,433 498,597,740 2,325,000 24,900,000,000
Source: Reuters3000 database 
Table 5.2 shows the distribution of deals over time and the mean value for the acquisitions 
for each year. It can be observed that the number of deals vary over time is following the 
merger wave pattern. Our sample consists of mergers from the fifth and the sixth merger 
waves. The percent of total deals and the yearly average deal value are considerably higher in 
2000 (25% of total deals with a average deal value of $2.9 bn.), 2005 (9.82% of total deals 
with a average deal value of $1.5 bn.), 2006 (13.39% of total deals with a average deal value 
Value Creation through Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions. 
An Empirical Study on European Acquirers of US Targets 
 
 
 52
of $3.5 bn.) and 2007 (12.5% of total deals with a average deal value of $3.3 bn.). It can be 
observed from our sample that merger activity in Europe was visibly lower during 2002-
2004. From 2004 to 2006 the average deal value doubled each year. This increase is 
consistent with the upward trend in the value of M&As during the same period.7  
Table 5.2: Sample Distribution over Time 
Period Total Number % of Total Average Deal Value (USD) 
1999 24 21.43% 735,309,674
2000 28 25.00% 2,935,100,928
2001 11 9.82% 392,747,435
2002 3 2.68% 94,441,667
2003 1 0.89% 14,300,000
2004 5 4.46% 750,013,109
2005 11 9.82% 1,505,657,054
2006 15 13.39% 3,520,108,715
2007 14 12.50% 3,297,678,086
Total 112 100.00% 1,974,885,433
Source: Reuters3000 database 
In table 5.3 the sample is divided according to the acquirer nation. It also reports the average 
deal value for each county.  As expected the country that has reported the most mergers is 
United Kingdom (29.46% of total), followed by France (21.43% of total). Germany, 
Netherlands and Sweden account for around 10% each. There are considerably fewer 
acquirers from the rest of the countries. 
Table 5.3: Sample Distribution According to the Origin of the Acquirer 
Acquirer Nation Total Number % of Total Average Deal Value 
Belgium 2 1.79% 30,393,458 
Denmark 1 0.89% 121,000,000 
Finland 5 4.46% 1,678,431,868 
France 24 21.43% 1,581,634,483 
Germany 15 13.39% 2,893,426,712 
Italy 3 2.68% 2,367,414,350 
Luxembourg 2 1.79% 2,675,537,173 
Netherlands 12 10.71% 2,575,542,912 
Norway 1 0.89% 2,345,958,828 
Spain 3 2.68% 2,943,528,809 
Sweden 11 9.82% 461,073,095 
United Kingdom 33 29.46% 2,171,042,799 
Total 112 100.00% 1,974,885,433 
 Source: Reuters3000 database 
                                                 
7 For comparison see Figure 2.1 
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Seven countries have an average deal value over $2 bn., Finland and France report mergers 
with an average value just over $1.5 bn. while the rest of the countries (Belgium, Denmark 
and Sweden) favour smaller acquisitions. 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics – Comparing Firm Characteristics 
In order to have an overview of the differences in underlying characteristics among acquirers, 
U.S. targets and benchmarks, which will facilitate giving a more accurate interpretation of 
the empirical findings, a section on descriptive statistics is provided before the results.  
Previous studies have shown that some firm characteristics may influence the value created 
through acquisitions. Such characteristics include firm size (for which we use Sales, Total 
Capital and Total Assets as a proxies), q-Ratio8 calculated as the natural logarithm of total 
capital to sales, Leverage determined as the ratio of book value of total debt to total assets, 
profitability (represented by EBIT/Sales), R&D/Sales and CAPEX/Sales9. 
5.2.1. Acquirer Sample Characteristics over the Three-Year Period Surrounding the 
Acquisition 
The descriptive statistics for firm characteristics of European acquirers one year prior to and 
one year following the acquisition, as well as the difference between them, are presented in 
Table 5.4. The significance of the difference in means is established using the parametric 
paired Student’s t-test. The significance of the difference in medians is determined by 
conducting the nonparametric Wilcoxon sign rank test10 (Wilcoxon, 1945).  
 
8 The q-Ratio is a proxy for a firm’s incentive to invest in new assets, and it will do that as long as q>0. A 
positive q-Ratio is also considered an indicator of a company being overvalued and vice-versa. 
9 Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop, 2003; Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002, and Mork and Yeung, 1991, studied the 
influence of R&D expenses on value creation; Berger and Ofek, 1995,  and Lang and Stulz, 1994, show that 
firm size is an important factor. 
10 The Wilcoxon sign rank test is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test that compares the median of a 
single column of numbers against a hypothetical median. It can be used as an alternative to the paired Student's 
t-test when the population cannot be assumed to be normally distributed. However, it does assume that the data 
are distributed symmetrically around the median and that the errors are independent. 
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The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 5.4: Acquirer Sample Characteristics over the Three-Year Period Surrounding the Acquisition 
ACQUIRER      
(t-1) Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Nr Obs 
Total capital 26,764,234.88 8,588,788.02 49,496,632.77 112 
Sales 12,537,988.41 4,922,315.05 19,473,757.91 112 
Total Assets 17,559,260.49 5,741,382.73 30,056,173.71 112 
q ratio (Sales) 0.5717 0.6354 0.9471 112 
Leverage 26.68% 25.67% 19.44% 112 
R&D/Sales 6.96% 11.66% 8.54% 75 
EBIT/Sales 12.50% 11.66% 13.65% 112 
CAPEX/Sales 5.86% 4.03% 5.40% 112 
 
ACQUIRER 
(t+1) Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Nr Obs 
Total capital 33,123,151.85 10,654,506.22 54,921,931.26 112 
Sales 15,936,878.47 6,515,749.70 22,392,001.36 112 
Total Assets 26,223,469.11 8,280,297.27 44,774,434.67 112 
q ratio (Sales) 0.5484 0.5294 0.8546 112 
Leverage 29.66% 29.70% 16.57% 112 
R&D/Sales 7.74% 10.87% 13.59% 78 
EBIT/Sales 9.59% 10.87% 18.15% 112 
CAPEX/Sales 6.65% 4.02% 7.40% 112 
 
Post-merger 
difference Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
p Value 
Mean 
p Value 
Median 
Nr 
Obs 
Pairs 
Total capital 6,358,916.97 1,067,464.14 39,259,853.06 0.08929* 0.0001*** 112
Sales 3,398,890.06 755,987.67 6,992,322.73 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 112
Total Assets 8,664,208.62 1,040,660.27 35,457,253.96 0.0110** 0.0000*** 112
q ratio (Sales) -0.0233 -0.0171 0.7618 0.74689 0.9745 112
Leverage 2.98% 2.59% 15.38% 0.0429** 0.0001*** 112
R&D/Sales 0.63% -0.81% 7.68% 0.38849 0.0365** 73
EBIT/Sales -2.91% -0.81% 14.39% 0.0347** 0.0115** 112
CAPEX/Sales 0.79% -0.14% 5.02% 0.0995* 0.6216 112
The table shows that in the first year following the acquisition (t+1), the acquirers of U.S. 
targets experience an overall significant increase in their mean and median size. The 
acquirers’ mean and median q-Ratios are positive in the year prior to and following the 
acquisition, but the difference between them, although positive, is statistically insignificant. 
We can observe a significant mean (median) rise in Leverage and decline in profitability, 
while for R&D/Sales and CAPEX/Sales the results are inconclusive.   
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5.2.2. Acquirer versus Target Firms Sample Characteristics in the Year Prior to the 
Acquisition 
In order to have an image of the pre-merger difference in size, investment incentive, 
Leverage, profitability and firm-specific characteristics between European acquirers and U.S. 
targets involved in merger activities in the period 1999-2007, we constructed Table 5.5. The 
statistical significance of the mean and median is determined and indicated in the same way 
as in the previous subchapter.  
Table 5.5: Paired-Sample Characteristics of Acquiring and Target Firms in the Year Prior to the 
Acquisition 
ACQUIRER 
(t -1) Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Nr Obs. 
Total capital 26,764,234.88 8,588,788.02 49,496,632.77 112 
Sales 12,537,988.41 4,922,315.05 19,473,757.91 112 
Total Assets 17,559,260.49 5,741,382.73 30,056,173.71 112 
q ratio (Sales) 0.5717 0.6354 0.9471 112 
Leverage 26.68% 25.67% 19.44% 112 
R&D/Sales 6.96% 11.66% 8.54% 75 
EBIT/Sales 12.50% 11.66% 13.65% 112 
CAPEX/Sales 5.86% 4.03% 5.40% 112 
 
Target (t -1) Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Nr Obs 
Total capital 5,839,486.22 466,697.77 41,309,937.13 112 
Sales 916,130.36 239,564.00 1,734,296.13 112 
Total Assets 1,231,623.06 292,501.00 2,863,981.13 112 
q ratio (Sales) 0.6803 0.6050 1.2581 112 
Leverage 23.68% 14.90% 29.30% 112 
R&D/Sales 17.88% 6.96% 36.92% 60 
EBIT/Sales -19.75% 6.96% 122.46% 112 
CAPEX/Sales 9.45% 3.65% 16.19% 112 
 
Pre-merger 
Difference Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
p Value 
Mean 
p Value 
Median 
Nr 
Obs. 
Pairs 
Total capital 20,924,748.66 5,817,488.01 63,994,881.04 0.0008*** 0.0000*** 112
Sales 11,621,858.05 3,992,258.28 19,161,153.08 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 112
Total Assets 16,327,637.42 5,346,189.38 29,843,898.23 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 112
q ratio (Sales) -0.1086 -0.0056 1.2559 0.3621 0.7026 112
Leverage 3.00% 3.02% 29.03% 0.2766 0.0720* 112
R&D/Sales -11.37% 5.51% 35.32% 0.0009*** 0.0085*** 45
EBIT/Sales 32.24% 5.51% 122.64% 0.0063*** 0.0000*** 112
CAPEX/Sales -3.59% 0.11% 15.52% 0.0161** 0.5392 112
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The results show strong evidence that European acquirers are significantly larger than their 
U.S. targets using all proxies (total capital, sales, total assets). For example, the mean 
(median) target companies’ total assets correspond to 7 % (6 %) of the acquirers’ mean 
(median) total assets before the mergers are completed. This is a somehow an expected 
result. The acquirers’ mean (median) q-Ratio is smaller than that of the foreign targets’, but 
the p-values do not show statistical significance, which means that the target firms are fairly 
valued relative to the acquirers. Furthermore, acquiring firms appear to be more profitable 
and financially levered than the foreign targets, but the latter is only slightly significant at a 
10% level. We cannot draw any conclusions about the difference in R&D/Sales, but we can 
conclude that the target firms have marginally more growth opportunities than the acquirers 
(the pre-merger difference in CAPEX/Sales has a mean of -3.59 %, which is statistically 
significant at 5% level). 
5.2.3. Target versus Benchmark Firms Sample Characteristics in the Year Prior to the 
Acquisition 
We will further report the descriptive statistics for the sample of 112 U.S. target firm-years, 
1188 firm-years included in the benchmark for the purpose of valuing the foreign targets, and 
the contemporaneous11 differences between their sample characteristics. The results are 
plotted in table 5.6. The statistical significance of the mean and median is determined and 
indicated in the same way as in the previous subchapters. 
There is strong evidence that U.S. targets are significantly smaller than the European firms 
included in the benchmark that have not yet diversified in the U.S. No matter what proxy we 
use for firm size (total capital, sales and total assets) the difference between targets and 
benchmarks is significant at 1% level. The q-Ratio is significantly larger for U.S. targets, 
which is a reason for us to think that they are overvalued compared to the European 
benchmark firms that have not geographically diversified in the U.S. The mean (median) q-
Ratio is 43.78% (25.11%) larger than that of the benchmark firms’ and it is significantly 
 
11 This is the reason we will have 112 available yearly observations (60 for R&D/Sales) for the targets, 1188 
yearly observations for the benchmarks and 112 (60) yearly observations for the difference between them. 
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different from zero at 1% level. The fact that the targets are overvalued one year prior to the 
acquisition may influence our results, therefore we have to control for overvaluation of the 
targets by introducing it as a dummy variable in the regression for excess value12.  Besides 
having higher mean R&D/Sales ratio, U.S. target firms have Leverage, profitability and 
CAPEX/Sales ratios that are lower relative to the European benchmark firms. For example, 
their mean (median) EBIT/Sales is about 32 % ( 5%) lower than that of the benchmark 
European firms at 1% level and their CAPEX/Sales is, on average, 4 %( 8 %) smaller than 
the benchmark’s at 1% level. 
Table 5.6: Paired-Sample Characteristics of Foreign Target and Benchmark Firms 
Target (t-1) Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Nr Obs 
Total capital 5,839,486.22 466,697.77 41,309,937.13 112 
Sales 916,130.36 239,564.00 1,734,296.13 112 
Total Assets 1,231,623.06 292,501.00 2,863,981.13 112 
q ratio (Sales) 0.6803 0.6050 1.2581 112 
Leverage 23.68% 14.90% 29.30% 112 
R&D/Sales 17.88% 6.96% 36.92% 60 
EBIT/Sales -19.75% 6.96% 122.46% 112 
CAPEX/Sales 9.45% 3.65% 16.19% 112 
 
 
 
Benchmark Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Nr 
Obs 
Total capital 1,952,993.82 198,250.84 4,720,371.49 1188 
Sales 1,551,293.60 197,803.00 3,996,485.55 1188 
Total Assets 2,297,773.74 224,377.31 6,165,789.31 1188 
q ratio (Sales) 0.1719 0.0278 1.1530 1188 
Leverage 25.57% 26.03% 18.46% 1188 
R&D/Sales 2.34% 0.52% 4.29% 1188 
EBIT/Sales 9.04% 6.57% 109.48% 1188 
CAPEX/Sales 27.77% 4.38% 408.61% 1188 
Tg(t-1) -
Benchm(t-1) Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
p Value 
Mean 
p Value 
Median 
Nr Obs 
Pairs 
Total capital 3,955,271.16 -1,264,066.70 41,283,960.33 0.3128 0.0000*** 112
Sales -546,250.30 -982,596.54 1,764,422.31 0.0014*** 0.0000*** 112
Total Assets -1,093,201.99 -1,526,141.93 2,879,357.69 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 112
q ratio (Sales) 0.4378 0.2511 1.2724 0.0004*** 0.0011*** 112
Leverage -1.13% -10.60% 29.34% 0.6831 0.0151** 112
R&D/Sales 6.98% -1.14% 28.51% 0.0108** 0.3138 60
EBIT/Sales -32.30% -5.22% 122.68% 0.0063*** 0.0000*** 112
CAPEX/Sales -3.67% -7.84% 16.62% 0.0213** 0.0000*** 112
                                                 
12 The construction of the dummy variable that controls for overvaluation of the targets is described in the 
Methodology part of this paper, more specifically in subchapter 4.5.  
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Overall, the descriptive statistics part of this paper illustrates that U.S. target firms are 
smaller in size compared to their acquirers and to the benchmark firms and that they are 
overvalued, less profitable, less financially levered and make fewer investments than 
European firms that have not yet diversified in the U.S. 
5.3. Analysis of the Excess Value Measures 
Having observed the differences in characteristics among acquirers, targets and benchmarks, 
the next step is to determine to what extent the mergers in our sample created value for the 
European acquirers, the U.S. targets and to study the relationship between the merging firms’ 
excess values. 
5.3.1. Acquirer Shareholder Wealth Changes in Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
The overall shareholder value created or destroyed by an acquiring company through a 
merger is represented by the actual change in excess value from t= -1 (the year prior to the 
acquisition) to t= +1 (the year following the acquisition). Table 5.7 summarizes the results of 
this valuation measure for our sample of 112 acquirers during the sample period 1999-2007. 
The statistical significance of the mean and median is determined and indicated in the same 
way as in the previous subchapters. 
Table 5.7: Excess Value Measures for Acquirers. Acquirer Shareholder Wealth Changes 
  Mean Median p Value Mean p Value Median 
EV-1 48.25% 55.60% 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
EV+1 47.70% 49.30% 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Δ EV -0.55% -1.39% 0.9389 0.9687 
In the year prior to the acquisition, acquiring firms are valued at a mean (median) premium 
of 48.24 % (55.6%) relative to the benchmark firms, and the excess values are significantly 
different from zero at 1% level. One year after the acquisition the acquirers are still 
overvalued, trading at a mean (median) premium of 47.7% (49.3%), significant at 1% level. 
Therefore, it is fair to say that European acquirers trade at a significant premium in the three-
year period surrounding the acquisition, relative to European companies that have not yet 
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established operations in the U.S. However, the actual acquisitions of U.S. targets determine 
a negative, but insignificant, mean (median) actual change in excess value ( EV has a value 
of -0.5% (-1.4%)). Consequently, no evidence was found of a significant increase or decline 
in the excess values of acquirers due to the acquisitions of U.S. targets. 
Δ
5.3.2. Target Shareholder Wealth Changes in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
The change in the target firms’ shareholder wealth associated with the cross-border 
acquisitions ( EV-1) is calculated as the difference between two measures of excess value: 
pre-effective excess value (EV-1E) and pre-announcement excess value (EV-1A).
Δ
13 The main 
difference between these two measures is that the latter does not take into account the 
valuation effects due to the acquisition announcement. The relative size of the acquisition is 
also examined here, defined as the ratio of the foreign target’s sales to the sum of both 
foreign target and U.S. acquirer sales in the year prior to the acquisition. 
Table 5.8 presents the two excess value measures as defined above and the change in target 
shareholders’ wealth, as well as the relative size of the acquisitions. The statistical 
significance of the mean and median is determined and indicated in the same way as in the 
previous subchapters. 
 
Table 5.8: Excess Value Measures for Targets. Target Shareholder Wealth Changes. Relative Sizes of 
Cross-Border M&As 
  Mean Median P Value Mean P Value Median 
EV-1A 58.92% 46.03% 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
EV-1E 85.50% 65.58% 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Δ EV-1 26.58% 25.89% 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Rel_Size-1 16.47% 10.30% 0.0000*** 4.008E-18*** 
 
The U.S. target companies are valued at a large premium relative to the benchmark firms one 
month prior to the announcement of the acquisition. The mean (median) pre-announcement 
excess value is 59% (56%) and it is significantly different from zero at 1% level. This result 
                                                 
13 The concepts of pre-effective EV and pre-announcement EV are defined in the Methodology part of this 
paper, more specifically in subchapter 4.4.2. 
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is in concordance with our findings in the descriptive statistics part of this paper14. The 
announcement of the acquisitions has a positive effect on target firms’ value, as it increases 
this premium even more. The mean (median) pre-effective excess value is 85.5% (65.58%), 
significantly different from zero at 1% level. The change in excess values reflects the wealth 
gains of foreign targets’ shareholders and is above 25% and always significantly different 
from zero at 1% level.  This outcome is consistent with Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 
2008, who also found that the announcement of an acquisition creates value for the target 
firms’ shareholders. The table also shows once more that the relative size of the cross-border 
acquisitions in our sample is fairly small15. The mean (median) ratio of the target’s sales to 
the merging firms’ combined sales is 16.47% (10.3%). 
5.3.3. The Relationship between Excess Values of the Merging Firms 
The unexplained change in excess value (Δ EV U ) measures the additional value created 
for the acquiring firm shareholders from the acquisition event, after accounting for the 
underlying characteristics of the target firms ( whether the target firms are overvalued, 
undervalued or “fairly” valued). 
1+
Δ EV U is calculated as the difference between the actual 
change in excess value (Δ EV ) and the projected change in excess value (Δ EV P )
1+
1+ 1+
16. 
Simply stated, the projected excess value represents the excess value of the merging firms if 
they combined their operations instantaneously in the year prior to the acquisition. Table 5.9 
presents the actual, projected and unexplained changes in excess values for acquirers of U.S. 
target firms from the year prior to the acquisition to the year following the acquisition. The 
statistical significance of the mean and median is determined and indicated in the same way 
as in the previous subchapters. 
 
 
                                                 
14 In subchapter 5.2.3 we empirically determined that U.S. targets are overvalued compared to the European 
benchmark firms that have not geographically diversified in the U.S. 
15 European acquirers were found in subchapter 5.2.2 to be significantly larger than their U.S. targets using three 
different proxies for company size (total capital, sales and total assets). 
16 The concepts of actual change in EV and projected change in EV are presented in detail in the Methodology 
part of this paper, more specifically in subchapter 4.4.1. 
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Table 5.9: Actual, Projected and Unexplained Changes in Excess Values for Acquirers of U.S. Firms 
  Mean Median p Value Mean p Value Median 
Δ EV+1 -0.55% -1.39% 0.9389 0.9687
Δ EV +1 P 2.78% 2.19% 0.4415 0.8379
Δ EV U +1 -3.33% -4.40% 0.6451 0.9894
 
The mean (median) actual change in excess value is -0.55% (-1.39%) and the projected 
change in excess value 2.78% (2.19%), but none of them are significantly different from zero 
at any significance level. Moreover, the mean and median unexplained changes in excess 
value are both negative but not significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with 
Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008, and indicates that geographical diversification of 
European bidders in the U.S. does not create or destroy value, even after considering the 
influence of the target firm’s valuation status (whether the target firm is overvalued, 
undervalued or “fairly” valued). In other words, buying overvalued U.S. targets17 does not 
cause any change in the excess values of European acquirers. A possible explanation would 
be that the value destroyed as a result of acquiring an overvalued company was compensated 
by the value created through synergies resulting from the merger.  
5.4. Regression Analysis  
The relationship between the excess value of the acquirer and of the target shareholders is 
further studied in a univariate regression framework. The intention is to determine how much 
of the actual change in the excess value is determined by the projected change in excess 
value and the influence of other factors: cultural difference, strength of the acquirer currency, 
acquirer’s leverage and R&D to sales ratio. All variables except for the dummy are measured 
relative to the benchmark. 
5.4.1. OLS Assumptions and Other Tests 
We begin by checking the appropriateness of the OLS model testing the OLS assumptions. 
In order to have a normal distribution for the residuals two observations were left out because 
                                                 
17 In subchapter 5.3.2 we found that U.S. targets are valued at a large premium relative to the benchmark firms 
at the time of the acquisitions. 
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they were distorting our results. Therefore our final sample consists of 110 observations. 
Further the results for the tests performed on this sample are presented.  
1. E (εi) = 0. If a constant term is included this assumption is never violated (Brooks, 
2002). A constant term is included regardless if it is statistically significant or not as the 
purpose of this analysis is to determine the value, sign and significance of this constant term 
that assesses the value creation through cross-border M&As.  
2. Var (εi) = σ2 < ∞. We test for heteroscedasticity by employing the White’s 
Heteroscedasticity test (White, 1980) with cross-product terms. This is a test of both 
heteroscedasticity and specification bias. If a test with no cross-product terms would have 
been used, it would have been a test of pure heteroscedasticity. The results of the test are 
presented in Appendix 1. Both the F and the χ2 versions of the test yield the same result that 
there is no evidence of heteroscedasticity. P values  for both tests are considerably higher 
than the 5% level of significance (78.66% for F version of the test and 72.88% for the χ2 
version of the test) 
3. Cov (εi, εj) = 0.  In order to determine the presence of auto-correlation between 
residuals we conduct a Breusch – Godfrey Serial correlation LM Test (Breusch, 1979 and 
Godfrey, 1978) with 5 lags. We consider that any autocorrelation that exists between the 
residuals should appear in 5 lags. The P value is 1 leading us to believe that the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected. For complete results see Appendix 2. 
Moreover because we have cross-sectional data any correlation existent can be avoided by 
changing the order of the observations. 
4.   Cov (εi, ∆EV+1, i) = 0. We test this assumption by regressing our dependent variable 
- the actual change in excess value with the residuals. The model should not explain any 
variation of the actual change in the excess value. The results for this auxiliary regression can 
be seen in Appendix 3. The model does not explain the movements of the dependent variable 
and the coefficient for the independent variable is not statistically different from zero. It can 
be concluded that there is no correlation between the residual and the dependent variable. 
5. ε ~ N (0, σ2). We check if the residuals are normally distributed by using a Jarque - 
Berra test (Jarque and Berra, 1980). This is a large sample test and it can be employed in our 
case. The initial value of the test for the 112 observation sample led us to reject the normality 
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assumption. After removing two of the observation that yielded disproportionate residuals we 
perform the test again.  The p-value for the Jarque – Berra (0.303720) is higher than the 5% 
level of significance leading to the conclusion that the normality condition is fulfilled (see 
Appendix 4). 
An implicit assumption is made when using OLS: the explanatory variables are not 
correlated (Brooks, 2002). If they were highly correlated the multi-collinearity problem 
would appear leading to inflated R2 and high standard errors for the coefficients. As a 
consequence the variables will not be significant, the coefficients will be very sensitive when 
adding or removing a variable and significance test will not give appropriate conclusions.  
We test for multi-collinearity by computing the correlation matrix of the coefficients. 
Table 5.10: Coefficient Correlation Matrix 
 ∆EVP+1 STR CD LEVERAGE RD_SALES 
∆EVP+1 1 -0.0861 0.1949 -0.0182 0.0972 
STR -0.0861 1 0.04669 0.2629 0.3115 
CD 0.1949 0.0466 1 -0.0480 0.1221 
LEVERAGE -0.0182 0.2629 -0.0480 1 0.4773 
RD_SALES 0.0972 0.3115 0.1221 0.4773 1 
As it can be observed the variables are not multi-collinear. The highest correlation coefficient 
is between leverage and R&D to sales ratio (0.4773). It is significantly smaller than 0.8 the 
level from which we can assume that the multi-collinearity is a important problem. 
We also run a Ramsey RESET test (Ramsey, 1969), a general test of specification error up 
to 6 fitted terms or not in order to determine if the linear model is suitable. Both the F and the 
χ2 versions of the test give the same result: there is no apparent nonlinearity in the regression 
as the p-values for both variants of the test exceed the 5% level of significance (0.365483 for 
F test and 0.270291 for χ2). The result form the auxiliary regression is reported in Appendix 
5.  
5.4.2. Regression Results  
We now analyze the relationship between the actual change in excess value of the acquirer 
and the projected change in excess value, cultural difference, strength of the acquirer 
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currency, R&D to sales ratio and leverage. The regression coefficients, their respective 
standard errors and p-values are presented in Table 5.11.  
Table 5.11: Regression Coefficients18 
  C ∆EVP+1 CD STR RD L 
Coefficient -0.0044 0.3853 * -0.0149* 0.4319** 1.1756 0.3113 
Standard error 0.1614 0.1977 0.0076 0.1584 0.9758 0.4008 
P Value 0.9781 0.0554 0.0519 0.0081 0.2325 0.4402 
As it can be seen from the table the actual change in the excess value of the acquirer is 
positively influenced by the projected change in excess value. The beta coefficient is 0.3853 
and it is statistically significant and different from one as shown by employing a Wald test. 
This means that the projected change in excess value does not fully transform in an actual 
change but accounts for some part of the variation. 
The cultural difference is significant at a 10% level and has a negative influence on the value 
creation as expected. This result is consistent with the study performed by Datta and Puia, 
1995. They concluded that the cultural difference between countries negatively influences the 
wealth effects of cross-border M&A-s.   
The strength of the acquirer’s currency has a coefficient of 0.4319 statistically significant at 
1% level. As Kang, 1993, and Froot and Stein, 1989 have argued before the bidder’s return 
should be positively correlated with the strength of their currency. 
The R&D to sales ratio is not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the 
result of a previous study performed by Cakici,  Hessel and Tandon, 1996, but opposite to 
others that have found that R&D intensive industries experience higher merger activity and 
the bidders are able to gain higher returns (Morck and Yeung, 1992; Harris and Ravenscraft, 
1991). 
                                                 
18 Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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The leverage is also insignificant showing that European investors do not put any value on 
any financial benefits that acquiring firms might have as a consequence of diversifying in 
US. 
Finally, the intercept, which shows the additional value creation or destruction beyond 
adding a new firm and controlling for other corporate variables, is negative (-0.0044) could 
potentially suggest value destruction. However, since it is statistically insignificant it 
indicates no significant value loss. This result is consistent with our findings in subchapter 
5.3.3. The unexplained change in excess value, which is a correspondent to the intercept in 
the regression framework, is also negative and insignificant.  
 It can be argued that the negative effect of the intercept on the bidder return is a consequence 
of adding an overvalued company. The European acquirer in search of opportunities to 
diversify internationally is buying an overvalued US firm as compared to a European 
benchmark.   
The explanatory power of the model is high compared to similar studies (Dos Santos, 
Errunza and Miller, 2008) with an R-squared of 0.243886 and an adjusted R-square of 
0.187460. The regression output from EViews can be seen in Appendix 6. 
5.4.3. Controlling for Overvaluation of the Target 
In order to control for the overvaluation of the target we compute a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 when the excess value of the target at t-1 is higher than zero (when the target is 
overvalued) and value 0 otherwise. This value is taken into account as an independent 
variable and the regression re-estimated. In this way we eliminate the effect of the 
overvaluation of the target from the intercept. We want to establish whether adding a fairly 
valued company is value-creating. We assume that synergies should be valuable and 
expressed by the intercept. 
We run the regression and perform again all the tests. The results from the tests do not 
change and all the OLS assumptions still hold. 
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Table 5.12 presents the coefficients, standard errors and corresponding p-values from the 
new regression. For the complete results see Appendix 7. 
Table 5.11: Regression Coefficients19 
  C ∆EVP+1 CD STR RD L OV 
Coefficient 0.3435 0.4563** -0.0162** 0.3777** 0.7878 0.3674 -0.4156** 
Standard error 0.2152 0.1937 0.0073 0.1550 0.9587 0.3887 0.1769 
P Value 0.1153 0.0215 0.0310 0.0175 0.4142 0.3480 0.0218 
The coefficients slightly change and the significance improves. However R&D to sales ratio 
and leverage variables are still insignificant.  
As expected the new dummy variable OV has a negative coefficient. The coefficient is 
significant at 5% level showing that by adding overvalued targets, acquirers destroy value.    
The intercept becomes positive confirming our anticipations. It is still insignificant even at 
10% level, but the p value (0.1153) improves a lot compared to the previous regression 
(0.9781). This shows that mergers are not simply value destroying, but rather depend on 
whether the target overvalued or not. However, due to insignificance of the intercept 
coefficient we cannot conclude that mergers are value destroying even when adding an 
overvalued company. Adding a fairly valued or undervalued company on the other hand can 
be considered to increase shareholder wealth if we accept a 12% significance level.   
Our model explains now 30.23% of the total variation in the dependent variable according to 
R-square measure and 23.88% according to adjusted R-square measure. 
 Our results are somehow consistent with previous studies. Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 
2008, showed that adding a fairly valued firm does not destroy value for the acquiring firm 
shareholders, Datta and Puia, 1995, found negative relation between cultural difference and 
bidder’s return and Kang, 1993, determined positive correlation between acquirer returns and 
the strength of the bidder’s currency. 
 
                                                 
19  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
Based on the results from the previous sections, this chapter offers concluding remarks and 
discusses the possibilities for further research.   
 
6.1. Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to determine to what extent cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 
related industries initiated by European companies with US targets are value-enhancing. We 
intend to establish how the correct valuation of the target influence the results and to what 
degree such a correct valuation leads to value creation for the shareholders of the acquiring 
firm. Further, it is determined to what extent the cultural difference between the countries 
and the strength of the acquirer currency influence the results alongside with corporate 
variables (R&D to sales ratio and leverage). The study will also determine the short term 
announcement effect on foreign target shareholder wealth (the return for target shareholders 
from announcement date to delisting).   
Transatlantic deals are fairly large transactions. Their value has varied over time following 
the merger wave pattern, but overall the average deal value increased, 2006 and 2007 being 
on average the years with the largest deal values. We claim that it is very important to 
determine whether these kind of deals are value creating or not and what influences the 
wealth creation through cross-border M&As. 
Our results show that, on average, U.S. target firms are overvalued, less profitable, less 
financially levered and make fewer investments compared to European firms that have not 
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yet diversified in the U.S. However, the target firm shareholders experience an increase in 
their wealth of over 25% from the announcement date up until delisting. 
As far as the European companies that decide to engage in transatlantic acquisitions are 
concerned, they were also found to be trading at a considerable premium in the three-year 
period surrounding the acquisition, relative to European benchmarks. Consistent with Dos 
Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008, no evidence was found of a significant increase or decline 
in the excess value of acquirers due to the acquisitions of U.S. targets in the year following 
the acquisition compared to the year prior to this event. 
Overall, our findings suggest that acquiring overvalued U.S. targets does not cause any 
change in the excess values of European acquirers. 
The results from the regression analysis confirm that adding overvalued targets do not 
destroy or create value. However, the overvalued firms seem to have a negative and 
significant influence on the shareholder value as it can be concluded from the second 
regression. On the other hand, acquiring a fairly valued or undervalued company has no 
statistically significant influence at 10% level, but is value creating at 12% significance level. 
The cultural difference is negatively correlated with the bidder’s return. The culturally farther 
away the countries are, the hardest it is to integrate the two entities and the acquiring firm 
shareholders experience a negative impact on their wealth.   
The strength of the bidder currency seems to be of great importance to the return gained by 
the acquiring company: the stronger the currency relative to USD, the higher the value 
creation through M&As.  This finding is consistent with the market timing strategy which 
managers can make use of when deciding on a merger deal. 
Both R&D to sales ratio and leverage do not have any significant influence on the change in 
excess value of the bidder. 
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The projected change in excess value has a direct influence on the return of the acquiring 
firm, but the two measures are statistically different. The projected change in excess value 
accounts only for part of the actual change. 
Overall the European bidders do not create or destroy value by adding an overvalued 
company relative to the year before the acquisition, but adding an overvalued company 
destroys the possible value created as an effect of the synergies resulting from the merger. 
 6.3 Proposals for Further Research 
The R square suggests that there are other variables that influence the dependent variable. 
Future research may take into account the international involvement status of the acquiring 
firm (whether or not the bidder establishes operations abroad for the first time), whether the 
acquisitions is influenced by management hubris, if acquisitions is financed by stock or cash, 
the difference between tax systems and legislation between acquirer country and target 
country. 
A study performed in the context of another target country, or during a different period might 
shed further light on whether or not acquiring a fairly valued target is value enhancing for the 
acquiring firm shareholders.  
An interesting issue would be studying targets from Eastern European countries and China 
and South-East Asia as there is evidence that mergers and acquisitions volume is increasing 
in these markets. 
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Appendix 1: White Heteroscedasticity Test 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
F-statistic 0.715499     Prob. F(19,53) 0.786607
Obs*R-squared 14.90209     Prob. Chi-Square(19) 0.728800
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/09   Time: 14:54   
Sample: 1 110   
Included observations: 73   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.287201 0.312650 0.918603 0.3625
PROJECTED_CHANGE 1.168574 1.367611 0.854464 0.3967
PROJECTED_CHANGE^2 0.099528 0.376070 0.264652 0.7923
PROJECTED_CHANGE*STR -0.892575 1.128680 -0.790814 0.4326
PROJECTED_CHANGE*CD -0.050907 0.040274 -1.264015 0.2118
PROJECTED_CHANGE*LEVERAGE 0.468539 1.522772 0.307688 0.7595
PROJECTED_CHANGE*RD_SALES 0.796778 7.597931 0.104868 0.9169
STR -0.003239 0.290219 -0.011160 0.9911
STR*CD -0.008279 0.024641 -0.335981 0.7382
STR*LEVERAGE 1.264486 1.416964 0.892391 0.3762
STR*RD_SALES -1.613399 3.612297 -0.446641 0.6570
CD 0.003896 0.066402 0.058666 0.9534
CD^2 0.000510 0.002140 0.238175 0.8127
CD*LEVERAGE -0.264730 0.128716 -2.056705 0.0447
CD*RD_SALES 0.432334 0.235330 1.837140 0.0718
LEVERAGE 1.316447 1.323329 0.994799 0.3244
LEVERAGE^2 -0.485102 1.477505 -0.328325 0.7440
LEVERAGE*RD_SALES 5.163086 9.024578 0.572114 0.5697
RD_SALES -1.388653 4.333535 -0.320443 0.7499
RD_SALES^2 -3.063926 9.848939 -0.311092 0.7570
R-squared 0.204138     Mean dependent var 0.346569
Adjusted R-squared -0.081171     S.D. dependent var 0.574586
S.E. of regression 0.597451     Akaike info criterion 2.035488
Sum squared resid 18.91822     Schwarz criterion 2.663012
Log likelihood -54.29533     F-statistic 0.715499
Durbin-Watson stat 2.115254     Prob(F-statistic) 0.786607
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Appendix 2: Breusch-Godfrey Auto-Correlation Test: 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
Obs*R-squared 0.000000     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 1.000000 
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/09   Time: 15:34   
Sample: 1 110   
Included observations: 73   
Presample and interior missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PROJECTED_CHANGE -0.099975 0.210530 -0.474873 0.6365 
STR -0.069875 0.175587 -0.397950 0.6920 
CD 0.005093 0.008205 0.620752 0.5370 
LEVERAGE 0.092438 0.423605 0.218216 0.8280 
RD_SALES 0.149127 1.035277 0.144046 0.8859 
C -0.006228 0.175047 -0.035582 0.9717 
RESID(-1) 0.153906 0.176359 0.872687 0.3862 
RESID(-2) 0.165440 0.167955 0.985030 0.3284 
RESID(-3) 0.376274 0.163139 2.306465 0.0244 
RESID(-4) 0.046584 0.187083 0.249001 0.8042 
RESID(-5) -0.112867 0.157377 -0.717176 0.4760 
R-squared -0.004704     Mean dependent var -4.22E-17 
Adjusted R-squared -0.166753     S.D. dependent var 0.592775 
S.E. of regression 0.640294     Akaike info criterion 2.084266 
Sum squared resid 25.41854     Schwarz criterion 2.429404 
Log likelihood -65.07571     Durbin-Watson stat 2.043337 
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Appendix 3: Verifying the correlation between residuals and dependent variable 
 
Dependent Variable: ACTUAL_CHANGE  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/09   Time: 15:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1 73   
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
RESIDUAL 0.097233 0.154454 0.629524 0.5310
C 0.145691 0.090927 1.602281 0.1135
R-squared 0.005551     Mean dependent var 0.145691
Adjusted R-squared -0.008456     S.D. dependent var 0.773621
S.E. of regression 0.776885     Akaike info criterion 2.359965
Sum squared resid 42.85202     Schwarz criterion 2.422717
Log likelihood -84.13872     F-statistic 0.396300
Durbin-Watson stat 1.773841     Prob(F-statistic) 0.531027
 
 
Appendix 4: Jarque - Berra Normality Test 
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Mean      -4.22e-17
Median   0.034003
Maximum  1.464868
Minimum -1.511956
Std. Dev.   0.592775
Skewness  -0.263597
Kurtosis   3.711068
Jarque-Bera  2.383298
Probability  0.303720
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Appendix 5: Ramsey RESET Test  
Ramsey RESET Test:   
F-statistic 1.112846     Prob. F(6,61) 0.365483 
Log likelihood ratio 7.582775     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.270291 
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: ACTUAL_CHANGE  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/09   Time: 19:45   
Sample: 1 110   
Included observations: 73   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PROJECTED_CHANGE -0.207818 0.530421 -0.391799 0.6966 
STR 0.186176 0.454685 0.409462 0.6836 
CD -0.001598 0.021057 -0.075875 0.9398 
LEVERAGE -0.372987 0.627155 -0.594729 0.5542 
RD_SALES 0.573631 2.027621 0.282908 0.7782 
C -0.069039 0.209939 -0.328853 0.7434 
FITTED^2 -0.909538 3.030689 -0.300109 0.7651 
FITTED^3 3.238954 14.30947 0.226350 0.8217 
FITTED^4 6.153834 14.09809 0.436501 0.6640 
FITTED^5 1.280949 47.53878 0.026945 0.9786 
FITTED^6 -4.553539 15.02772 -0.303009 0.7629 
FITTED^7 -3.783241 43.52774 -0.086916 0.9310 
R-squared 0.318485     Mean dependent var 0.075120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.195589     S.D. dependent var 0.681705 
S.E. of regression 0.611414     Akaike info criterion 2.003097 
Sum squared resid 22.80347     Schwarz criterion 2.379611 
Log likelihood -61.11305     F-statistic 2.591495 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.514156     Prob(F-statistic) 0.009020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value Creation through Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions. 
An Empirical Study on European Acquirers of US Targets 
 
 
 80
Appendix 6: The Initial Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: ACTUAL_CHANGE  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/09   Time: 16:10   
Sample (adjusted): 1 110   
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PROJECTED_CHANGE 0.385316 0.197653 1.949456 0.0554 
STR 0.431910 0.158352 2.727533 0.0081 
CD -0.014949 0.007553 -1.979173 0.0519 
LEVERAGE 0.311252 0.400817 0.776544 0.4402 
RD_SALES 1.175556 0.975792 1.204720 0.2325 
C -0.004448 0.161410 -0.027556 0.9781 
R-squared 0.243886     Mean dependent var 0.075120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.187460     S.D. dependent var 0.681705 
S.E. of regression 0.614496     Akaike info criterion 1.942587 
Sum squared resid 25.29954     Schwarz criterion 2.130844 
Log likelihood -64.90444     F-statistic 4.322196 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.438470     Prob(F-statistic) 0.001813 
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Appendix 7: Controlling for the overvaluation of the target 
 
Dependent Variable: ACTUAL_CHANGE  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/09   Time: 22:04   
Sample (adjusted): 1 110   
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PROJECTED_CHANGE 0.456292 0.193671 2.356011 0.0215 
CD -0.016150 0.007329 -2.203731 0.0310 
STR 0.377684 0.154991 2.436817 0.0175 
RD_SALES 0.787758 0.958745 0.821655 0.4142 
LEVERAGE 0.367386 0.388673 0.945234 0.3480 
OVERVALUED_TARGET -0.415634 0.176864 -2.350024 0.0218 
C 0.343521 0.215245 1.595950 0.1153 
R-squared 0.302269     Mean dependent var 0.075120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.238839     S.D. dependent var 0.681705 
S.E. of regression 0.594750     Akaike info criterion 1.889626 
Sum squared resid 23.34604     Schwarz criterion 2.109259 
Log likelihood -61.97134     F-statistic 4.765395 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.338410     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000432 
 
 
 
